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Introduction 
The extent to which services should be performed in market or by state, is the 
everlasting balancing of democracy and efficiency. Equality and liberty. 
The extent to which power is delegated to politically independent bodies – fixes 
this balance. One of the core missions of the Political Economist is thus to reveal 
The politicians’ internal incentive-structure in determining levels of devolution, 
delegation and intensity of governance towards such independent bodies. 
 
For a long time, functionalist theory, economics, organizational theory and 
sociology have been dominant scholarly camps in search for such answers.  
Explanations often tend to focus on either (i) the (desired) end-state of the 
institutional product, (ii) rational choice analysis of the actors making decision 
and (iii) the sociological situation around the actor. Quantitative evidence though, 
has traditionally been lacking. However, with roots to both the (ii) and (iii) 
scholarly camp, transaction cost economics has in recent years emerged as a fresh 
breath within this scholarly domain. 
 
In 1995, political Economist Murray J. Horn presented an innovative causal 
interpretation of variances in parliamentary control over services and goods 
provision in markets. Instead of focusing on the efficiency or democratic 
characteristics of an institutional end-product, he applies a transaction cost 
approach to analyze decision-makers’ alternative incentives for different 
institutional setups in the public administration. 
Horns prediction is, put simply: that Ministers of Parliament1
That is; politicians ‘remove themselves’ from conflict – by increasing devolution 
of those institutions handling sensitive political issues, thus organizing the public 
administration and state owned companies based on eligibility-concerns and not 
democratic and\or economic ones. A thesis which, if confirmed, will have major 
implications on the balancing of private\public goods provision. 
In this paper, Horns hypothesis is tested on empirical data from Norway: Legal 
and structural characteristics of 31 state-owned companies and 16 public  
 (MP’s) will choose 
to delegate or outsource those tasks which carry with them a high degree of 
‘political conflict’   - to depoliticize the issue, and increase their eligibility. 
                                                 
1 Or its equivalent representatives of House and Senate in the U.S 
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administration bodies are used, together with questionnaire data from their 
respective board-members – to test the relationship between political conflict and 
the intensity of governance between ministries and their subordinate 
companies\institutions. A structural equation model is then developed to try to 
systemize the complex multifactor causality in which these variables are part of. 
Results show that while Horns hypothesis was not entirely off the map, country 
specific differences makes it hard to generalize, and insufficient as a single 
explanatory model.  
Research method: 
“SOEs occupy an important sector of the economy where both political and 
market forces coexist and interact. Explanation of SOE autonomy would, 
therefore, require simultaneous consideration of theories and approaches from 
both political and market or economic perspectives” (Lioukas et al 1993:646) 
 
A transaction-cost model is built, based on the theoretical predictions of Political 
Economist Murray J. Horn. Actions of politicians are empirically mapped and 
tested, to look for fit with such a model. Sociological, functionalist and 
organizational theory is used to construct a meaningful model, and to explain 
misfits. Data has been collected through several sources explained in detail in the 
appendix, and structured in a common spreadsheet. Some have been coded into 
indexes and some filled in directly. SPSS software has been used to perform 
bivariate R2 correlations. Covariance matrixes have been written into a LISREL 
syntax to test the data in a structural equation model. Significant and strong 
correlations are commented on and put in system with others. Adjustments to the 
model have been attempted along the way, to gain a better understanding of what 
the data is saying. A more thorough explanation of methods is given underway, 
especially under the heading ‘building the model’. As this is the first attempt at 
testing such a transaction-cost model on empirics, the paper has an exploratory 
nature. Different variables are considered, and factor analysis used to end up with 
the best possible set of measurement indicators. However, as the intention of the 
paper is to test a specific hypothesis, the interpretation of the model once built – 
takes the form of a confirmatory analysis. 
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Theoretical backcloth 
 
State Owned companies 
A vast variety of terms and definitions exists for companies which are subsidized 
or partially or fully owned by the state. State owned companies, state owned 
enterprises, government owned corporations, state owned entities, publicly owned 
corporation and parastals are all different names for more or less the same thing. 
Usually – one classifies such bodies based on their legal status, which can vary 
from stock companies with state as shareholder – to corporations which is a part 
of government.  Common to all of them is that they are established to operate in 
commercial markets, while the justification of the states ownership can vary from 
profit goals to specific public policy goals. In this paper, the terms will be used 
interchangeably – referring to companies where the state is the dominant owner. 
Companies used in the analysis will be classified in categories based on their 
political objectives.   
 
State-owned companies ‘occupy an organizational space between pure 
government departments and pure private market enterprises’  (Salamon 
2002:81). Being more specific is difficult, as; ‘So many structural variations are 
possible that precise definitions are hard to apply’ (Ibid.). Across countries, state-
owned companies exist in a variety of forms and shapes, where critical 
distinctions relate to:  
(i) Private or public control over the organization 
(ii) Whether it is chartered to serve a public  or private purpose 
(iii)The nature of subsidies from government to organization 
(Salamon 2002:81) 
Jan-Erik Lane divides these companies, or ‘public firms’ as he calls them, into 
two regimes: The traditional regime; where the institution is a hybrid of a 
company and a bureau – protected by public regulation; yielding it monopoly 
rights, while being financed by the finance ministry, and, the neo-liberal regime; 
where the institution is organized as a joint stock company in private competition, 
where the states role is limited to ownership of equity (Lane 2005:190). As  
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becomes evident, it is the emphasis towards the one or the other regime which 
creates debate over efficiency vs. principal-agent problems and accountability. 
Raison d’être 
The goals of conducting tasks through a government corporation can be multiple. 
Most usually, it relates to corporate governance and business ethics. Sometimes 
the initial goal can be the financing of non-sustainable businesses considered to 
carry out an important role in society. Sometimes it is the balancing of the private 
markets, and equality concerns. Some also consider the company form to better 
capture pressures from customers and shareholders (Eliadis et.al 2005:10). 
As stated by Lioukas, Bourantas, and Papadakis (1993) : 
 
“It [the SOE] is expected to relieve government of some of the burden of decision 
making and overload with technical and specialised issues. Placing enterprise 
decisions outside politics and ministerial bureaucracy is assumed to promote the 
efficiency of both enterprises and government. Some government direction and 
control, on the other hand is inevitable, for government is ultimately responsible 
for SOE performance. It is not at all certain that the many public policy aims 
pursued by government through SOEs can be secured by enterprise management 
alone without some direction and control from the state and its organs.” 
(Lioukas et.al 1993:645) 
 
The public-ownership goal which will be mostly relevant for this thesis, is the one 
of efficiency relative to public administration, and the veil it can serve as for 
‘depoliticizing’ (thoroughly explained in a couple of pages). As an answer to 
NPM demands, but a limitation of privatization, the government corporation rests 
as a golden mean for the politician, which can claim increased efficiency while 
still largely controlling the budgets.  
Whether  the goal is to increase revenues for the state, or to protect ‘residential 
customers’, state-owned companies are in most instances used to increase 
flexibility / maneuverability of operations. Moving tasks from public 
administration towards independent companies is often considered a push towards 
a more liberal economy, but questions of accountability and transparency soon 
become present. As is evident, boards of directors which are not subject to  
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 7 
 
democratic elections – might easier be corrupted. As opposed to administrative 
bodies, the state-owned companies are not governed by public law, but private. 
State-SOE relationships 
In such an institutional arrangement, democratically elected politicians and their 
bureaucrats – establish a principal-agent relationship with board members and 
CEO’s of the respective companies. Some might be chosen directly by the 
ministry, some might represent staff. 
“Whatever the origins and intentions of state control, experience has shown that 
the state-SOE relationship is multifaceted, with considerable variations across 
SOEs and countries. Multiple controls are usually applied, while the kind of 
issues and decisions controlled and the specific mechanisms and procedures 
through which controls are applied may vary substantially across SOEs. 
Irrespective of formal or informal mechanisms, however, the end result, i.e., the 
actual autonomy of SOEs, may be influenced by -certain important economic and 
political factors acting behind the observed diversity of controls.”  
(Lioukas et.al 1993:645) 
 
Based on this argumentation, the three authors S. Lioukas, D. Bourantas, and V. 
Papadakis has written a paper on determining factors of Managerial Autonomy of 
State-Owned Enterprises. 
Their paper is the most similar academic publication to mine which I have found, 
and besides my work, I believe it is the only quantitative investigation performed 
on the State-SOE relationship. Their model looks as following: 
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While Horn builds a theoretical (transaction-cost) model for explaining the 
determinants of state-SOE relationships and ministerial control, Lioukas, et.al 
builds and empirically tests a model aiming at measuring Managerial autonomy as 
dependent on SOE characteristics such as resource dependence, size, political 
visibility and performance. While this paper uses the board of directors, Lioukas 
et.al has been using the company managers. The former is chosen here, as it lies 
closer to political control, but in fact (and in retrospect), it would probably be 
ideal to use both simultaneously. The main findings in their report is that total 
SOE control is positively correlated to financial dependency, the proportion of 
directors appointed by government, the degree of social orientation of the 
enterprise and size. Competition and innovativeness push in the opposite 
direction. The model thus looks much like mine, only that ‘conflict’ is added – 
and Norwegian data applied. As I became aware of this research only after having 
written most of this paper, it is fascinating to see the similarities in our analytic 
setup. 
Being able to pinpoint statistically significant relationships between SOE 
characteristics and their managerial autonomy is vital to our awareness of the 
states control over the economy. So far however, this paper, together with the one 
of Lioukas et.al and Horn seems to be some of few.  
(The ones I have identified are: Aharoni and Vernon 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Salancik 1979; Sexty 1980; Monsen and Walters 1983) 
 
First of all, as Aharoni (1981) commented; "much of the research in SOE is 
concerned with how the enterprises should behave... . Almost no research has 
been done on why SOEs function as they do."  
 
Secondly, as Lioukas et. Al (1993:646) state; “systematic attempts to measure the 
intensity of control and its relationship to determining factors are scanty. 
Relationships assumed and, hence, policy prescriptions are seldom based on 
quantitative evidence.” 
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Depoliticizing - Faustian bargain or strengthened credibility? 
‘Depoliticizing’ commonly refers to either supranational delegation (to 
institutions such as the world bank, the EU, IMF, UN etc.) or national 
‘agencification’ of the central government – disaggregating the representative 
democracy (Flinders and Buller 2006:53).  
Opposed to the intuition of many, the common normative conception of 
Depoliticizing is one of a ‘good’ thing. This is because it yields positive 
development or upheaval of trust in a democracy – thus often increasing state 
capacity and market confidence (ibid:54). 
However – the concept also brings with it major democratic implications, of 
which are according to Flinders and Buller ‘rarely examined’. According to them, 
depoliticizing should be defined as;  
“the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can 
attempt to move an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the 
demos that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, 
policy field or specific decision” (Ibid:55). 
 
Depoliticizing can manifest itself in three different forms; (i) Organizational, (ii) 
rule-based, and (iii) preference-shaping. Rule-based relates to legal procedures 
controlling decision-making, while preference shaping relates to changing trends, 
thus creating conceptions of what should and shouldn’t lie within the governance 
of the state (such as New Public Management\Post NPM). Organizational 
depoliticizing, often referred to as ‘agencification’ – is among the most used 
tactics of depoliticizing (Ibid:58), and the one we investigate here.  
 
The establishment of a principal-agent relationship between a majoritarian and a 
non-majoritarian institution, separates the body from political cycles, and should 
thus foster stability and professionalism. It also implicates, as pointed out by 
Habermas  (1996) – that transparency and accountability in the representative 
democracy is reduced. Another threat is one that showed itself in the post WW2 
nationalization of industries in Great Britain: While formal arrangements was set 
up between government and boards (in a manner quite similar to the one applied 
in Norway today), ministers could not resist the temptation to interfere through  
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informal (and thus non-measureable) channels, such as speeches, statements, and 
even lunches (“Agency capture”) (Flinders and Buller 2006).  
 
As Flinders and Buller put it: “…the formal statutory relationship acted as a veil 
for de-facto ministerial control” (2006:60). This resulted in even poorer 
efficiency of the industries, which again caused further more ministerial 
interference. It is thus important to separate between the ‘principled commitment’ 
and the actual ‘practical implementation’ of depoliticizing (Ibid.).  
Some of the main negative effects of depoliticizing are accountability problems, 
arena shifting and increased complexity - often resulting in increased public 
apathy. The ministerial responsibility is often used as a ‘shield rather than a 
sword’ (Ibid:74) – while voters no longer grasp which institutions are responsible 
for what policy, and thus become passive. 
 
Underlying this, the danger is that;  
“depolitization is not purely concerned with the formal process of devolving 
decisions or attempting to remove discretion. It has deeper connotations relating 
to altering public expectations and changing the perceptions of those who are 
affected by policy outcomes” (Ibid:68) 
 
In this respect, it is true what Peter Burnham claims; that depoliticizing is ‘a 
potent form of ideological mobilization’ (Burnham 2001). 
According to OECD’s (2002) research - national legislatures have largely failed to 
develop oversight mechanisms in line with the development and modernization of 
state structures. 
Explaining institutional choice  
The question at hand in this paper, is not only a question of high or low control of 
existing institutional structures, but also of why certain tasks are met by a specific 
institutional setup in the first place. The literature on institutional choice can 
therefore help to illuminate the backcloth of findings made in this paper. 
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A mix of many scholars 
Institutional choice is traditionally explained through solely, or a mix of either 
functionalism, sociology, deliberative theory, power theory, institutionalism, 
organizational theory, corporate governance literature, economics (often in the 
form of profit maximization), or as a component of the debate over public and 
private goods. The main arguments from these scholarly camps are very roughly: 
Either, the creation of (and choice of using) a certain institution is conducted to 
reach its goals in the best manner possible (functionalist) – or it is created to be as 
cost-effective as possible (economic) – or the people working in it will shape it 
according to their needs/priorities (sociology/principal agent/new 
institutionalism), or the strongest principal (in this respect owner) decides (power 
theory), if not the contrary where debate amongst all concerned actors yield output 
(deliberative theory). Classical Weberian power theory could be an example of 
both the latter, and in this, so called “lunch-table power” would probably also be 
included. According to the corporate governance literature, the desired end-state is 
proper regulation, as is also the case in the debate over private and public goods 
provision. Organizational theory rather explain the shape of the instrument (SOC) 
as an adaption to the environment (size of user group, market type etc.), which is 
closely linked to the new-institutionalist belief that institutions constantly change 
– and should be regarded as a ‘living organism’. 
 
Similar to my classification of relating theoretical perspectives, Christensen and 
Lægreid (2006) separate the field of agencification and regulatory reforms in the 
following manner;  
• Rational economic perspectives –  Focusing on the choices of rational 
actors 
• Public interest perspectives – Considering agencification as a process of 
increasing welfare, justice and fairness 
• Principal agent perspectives  – Regarding the process and structure as a 
response to information asymmetry 
• Organizational theory / bounded rationality – Regarding the process and 
structure as a response to capacity problems 
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• Self interest / regulatory capture – Agencies lobby for regulation which 
will benefit them, and perform ‘bureau shaping’ (Niskanen).  
• Institutional perspectives – Informal norms and identities, ideas and 
culture within institution shape its structure and policy.  
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006:14-21) 
 
The more important scholarly contributions will be reviewed below: 
Functionalism Vs non-functionalism 
In the mind of the functionalist, institutional design is constructed to yield the best 
possible policy output.  “The proposition that ‘some forms of public action are 
more likely to address successfully certain public problems or social issues than 
others’ lies at the heart of how governments approach choices about instruments” 
(Eliadis et.al 2005:4) 
 
Functionalist arguments typically hold that the use of solely economic 
perspectives (efficiency, costs etc.) tends to neglect the fundamental objective of 
good instrument choices, namely good governance. Said in a different manner, 
they seem to focus on the balance between efficiency and democratic legitimacy, 
with extra emphasis to the latter. 
 
Anti-functionalist explanations of delegation however, basically hold that; 
a) The need to delegate is socially constructed – not just functional  
 
b) The variation in delegation is large, thus functionality cannot explain all. 
c) Even where similar delegation practice occurs, timing is different. 
                                                                                        (Thatcher and Sweet 2002) 
 
To encapsulate this difference, Thatcher (2002) recommends that one avoid the 
single use of pure Principal-Agent analysis, but also include analysis of 
sociological creation of interests, institutional isomorphism and institutional 
legacies2
                                                 
2 The capacity of the state to transform, delegate and monitor. 
.  
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Firstly; “State structures and institutional legacies affect the relative costs and 
benefits of different organizational forms” (Thatcher and Sweet 2002:11-12). 
Secondly, interests has proven to be a major influence of institutional choice as it 
has been shown that; “Elected officials confronted by scandals, technological 
complexity and international pressures, together with new ideas and examples for 
reform – concluded that having direct control over policy, was no longer 
advantageous”  (Ibid.) 
Thirdly, the post-NPM literature will confirm that isomorphism has had a major 
effect on institutional choice in recent decades. 
 
These parameters are important, as they tell the story of how choices must not 
only be desired but also legitimate. The comparative advantage of delegation – is 
that it has a high level of “Output legitimacy”3. The advantage of central control is 
that it has a high level of “Procedural legitimacy”4
While being perfect functional estimators, the company characteristics and the 
operational environment poorly captures interests and sentiments in the decision 
making process. Nonetheless, these seem to be the SOE-literature’s most 
commonly used parameters. 
 (Thatcher and Sweet 2002:18-
19). It becomes obvious how non-functional interests play a major role in 
decision-making.  
 
Sociological aspects can partially be captured through the ownership variable, as a 
certain “governance-culture” can be assumed to exist within the different 
ministries. Also, the type of sector in which the company is operating – can show 
signs of trends and isomorphism.  
Deregulating and devolution can in itself also be seen as a result of isomorphism – 
as exposure to competition is in periods seen as “good governance”. The 
institutional legacies can further be measured from the capacities of the governing 
ministry, as well as the measurability of the specific company’s operations 
(Thatcher and Sweet 2002). However, this is about as far as we have gotten in 
understanding non-functionalist influences within the SOE research domain. 
 
                                                 
3 Quality and content of services are not directly politically determined, and are fully transparent. 
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A recent study by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) is one of those few 
contributions which systematically investigate institutional choices for delegation. 
Based on data from the U.S congress, they found patterns of high and low 
delegation and discretion towards regulatory agencies, based on the political 
environment which surrounds them. With discretion as a dependent variable, and 
a set of independents such as ‘divided government’ and ‘uncertainty’ – they find 
positive relationships, confirming a trend close to the one which is investigated 
here. 
Determining relative degrees of executive authority  
When institutional structures are finally established, the amount of autonomy of 
the enterprise is to some extent determined. However, there is still a range of 
varieties in the control exerted towards structurally identical institutions. 
According to Wickesberg (1958), several stages or degrees may be identified in 
establishing the amount of freedom applying to any given problem. Firstly, the 
executive may exercise: 
 
Degree: 
A: Final rights of decision  
B: Final rights of decision but within broad policy limits 
C: Final rights of decision but must report action taken to his superior; and 
D: Final rights of decision only after consultation with or approval by his superior. 
This can both be general rulings, or case-dependent.  
 
The second component that must be considered concerns the executive level at 
which such decisions are made: 
 
“Generally, in comparing relative degrees of delegation among several 
companies, superior delegation of one over the other is signaled by either fewer 
restrictions at a given level or by a lower level at which a given amount of 
freedom is enjoyed. Such comparisons may be made by a variation of the paired 
comparisons techniques .” (Wickesberg 1958:19) 
 
                                                                                                                                     
4 Democratic decision-making concerns are fully upheld by laws and institutional structures. 
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That is; to measure levels and degrees of decision-making and comparing them 
across companies.  
In this analysis, these guidelines are followed through A: mapping the legal basis 
of the firm (which tells us what types of rules governs decision-making processes) 
B: mapping which companies are subject to imposed consultation (§10) C: 
investigating how large the fraction of employees represented in he board is, D: 
measuring the length of their mission statement, and last but just as important E: 
mapping the board members own conceptions of freedom.   
Principle-Agent literature – and why leaders delegate.  
In political institutions – delegation is often considered both a balancing of 
powers and a ensuring of quality. Delegation studies have shown that degree is 
dependent both on principal and agent properties (Schriesheim et. al 1998). For 
instance, in a 1982 report on school superintendents, Seversky found that those 
with more job experience seemed to use delegation more commonly than recently 
employed – addressing the fact that experience matters. This conclusion is 
supported by a range of other papers such as Blankenship and Miles (1968), 
Campbell (1956) and Stogdill and Shartle (1955). This might help explain the 
pattern of different management within ministries – as some are simply more 
experienced than others. 
Another feature defining levels of delegation, is the amount of secrecy\discretion 
which needs to be held in a policy area. Tannenbaum and Massarik (1950) in this 
respect showed a positive correlation between secrecy and low levels of 
delegation. 
 
One of the more outstanding delegational studies, namely the one of Leana 
(1987), address three main situations where the level of delegation will be low; 
When tasks are considered too important, when subordinates are not trusted, or 
when tasks are considered too technically complex.  
In another paper published the same year, Dewhirst, Metts, and Ladd (1987) more 
or less landed on the same conclusion. Leana also derived that large workloads 
would affect delegation in the opposite direction – by increasing it as a necessary 
mean to overcome tasks. As we will see, this workload\size effect will also be 
significant in this papers results. An interesting feature from Leanas study  
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however, was that neither supervisors’ personalities nor predispositions to share 
authority nor subordinates satisfaction were significantly related to delegation. 
While Hollingsworth and AL-Jafary (1983) also seems address confidence in 
subordinates as a main explanatory effect, Matthews (1980) pinpoint the risk-
willingness of managers as a crucial factor. Shapira (1976) supported the 
proposition that delegation is more likely when subordinates have access to 
organizationally relevant information.  
 
Unfortunately, studies of the balancing between agency and political control have 
for a long time suffered from great measurement difficulties (See Pollack 2002). 
This is partially due to the fact that actual degrees of delegation cannot always be 
measured directly, as it exists in formal as well as informal shapes – and mostly in 
combination of both. 
For instance, ‘amount\use of sanctions’ has often been considered a covering 
measure of autonomy. But as noted by Pollack; 
 
“Studies of agency autonomy that rely on the frequency of sanctioning are […] 
likely to run into the methodological problem of observational equivalence, 
namely that the absence of sanctions is consistent with both the obedient servant 
and the runaway bureaucracy scenarios, each of which predicts, albeit for 
different reasons, the rarity of sanctions.”  
(Pollack 2002:202) 
 
Faced with such methodological challenges, an increasing number of scholars 
have shifted from a rational-choice analysis on the behavior of the agent, to 
focusing on the stage where decisions are made concerning the delegation of 
powers and the imposing of control mechanisms to limit autonomy. 
 
“Indeed, an increasing number of American scholars have recently turned to the 
literature on the transaction costs of policy making to generate specific 
predictions about the conditions under which legislative principals will allocate 
discretion – defined by Epstein and O’Halloran as the net of initial delegation 
minus the administrative and oversight mechanisms established to limit shirking – 
to their agents.” (Pollack 2002:207) 
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In Pollack’s opinion, these types of studies can roughly be said to concern 
themselves with three parts of the political environment, which affects transaction 
costs of policies – and thus also the level of delegation and\or discretion. These 
are; 
(1) Imperfect information, and the demand for policy-relevant expertise. 
(2) Credible commitments, and the demand for an independent, credible 
regulator.  
(3) Conflicting preferences among principals, and between principals and agents. 
(Ibid:208) 
While the former represents the quality argument of delegation or devolution, the 
second represents the democratic one. The latter scholarly domain however, is the 
one which this paper can relate the closest to. 
 
Here one has to make sure to separate between conflict which is external and 
conflict which is internal to the chain of command. In this analysis, the 
hypotheses is that a large extent of conflict and debate either internally in 
parliament, in government and\or in the public media, will yield more slack to 
agents (leaders of state enterprises). At the same time, one would be wise to 
remember Huber’s’ suggestion that;  
 
‘Granting substantial autonomy to civil servants will have the greatest payoff to 
ministers when conflict of interest between ministers and civil servants is low’ 
(Cited in Pollack 2002:209).  
The intra-conflict between principals and agents is not considered here. 
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Implementing the transaction cost approach: 
As thoroughly noted in the preceding sections - explaining, legitimizing or 
promoting devolution of tasks from parliament through (further) independent 
governance of public administration and/or state-owned companies – mainly takes 
on two types of argumentation from the literature; 
 
a) Democratic approaches; emphasizing that public choice will lead to a 
higher degree of customer participation and influence, 
and  
b) Efficiency approaches; emphasizing that increased market exposure will 
increase transparency and competition – and thus yield more economically 
efficient services. 
 
In a 1995 publication however, Political economist Murray J. Horn proposed a 
third potential (transaction cost) explanation of such choices, namely; 
 
c) The eligibility approach; emphasizing that increased devolution and 
delegation will decrease MP’s accountability in certain policy areas. 
 
Rather than investigating the quality or equality of public services, his question 
was simply; could it be that politicians – in leaving more slack to boards and 
CEO’s of state owned companies and institutions – are actually performing 
depoliticizing?  Could it be, that in choosing instruments (institutional choice) – 
policy makers are mostly concerned with their own personal preferences? That in 
making such choices, the policy maker is mostly concerned with popularity, 
political strategy and re-election? According to Horn;  
 
“[Legislators] typically take an active and detailed interest in the specific 
institutional arrangements they will employ in any given situation, like 
governance, financing, and employment arrangements; the extent to which 
decision making is delegated to the administrative level; and the procedures 
governing private participation in this decision making.” (Horn 1995:182)  
 
While this is more or less the common conception, he further claims that;  
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“Electoral competition encourages legislators to take decisions that will increase 
their net political support and to protect their preferred policies from 
administrators and future legislators” (Ibid:182). 
 
Based on this assumption, Horn provides a transaction cost model, trying to 
predict institutional choices based on the amount of’ legislative costs’ imposed on 
parliament – which are assumed to increase as ‘conflict’ surrounding the specific 
body increases (this is due to the fact that increased disagreement (or ‘conflict’) 
within parliament will imply more costly bargaining). In other words; a model 
which makes it ‘costly’ for politicians to govern an unpopular issue or sector.  
 
Usually, the literature has considered an ideological policy goal to be the basis for 
such instrument choices – and the discussion has focused on whether the 
economical efficiency or the functional accomplishment of reaching these goals 
has been the more important one. The recent emergence of the Political Economy 
discipline however, has added this third viewpoint, which suggests that the 
reasoning behind yielding powers to independent bodies can sometimes be the 
wish to reduce power of future legislators, or to avoid negative association with 
the business of the body (depoliticizing). It is this view which will be investigated 
and tested in this paper.  
 
The ambitious attempt at merging an econometric model of transaction costs with 
classical institutionalist and functionalist theories – is not very common in the 
literature. The research design will thus have an exploratory nature, rather than a 
predictive one. The research question finds itself in-between the welfare-economy 
and political economy schools – in the respect that it will both investigate whether 
the link between individual preferences in parliament shapes institutional choice, 
but also tries to understand what economist often simply assume; namely the logic 
of the rationale for policy-instrument choices. It will be a contestation between 
welfare ideology, and pure rational strategy. Further, it will also aim at 
encapsulating some of the effects which are not at all linked to the individual 
level, but rather the systemic. In respect to Michael Howletts classification of 
“substantive” policy tools (aimed at altering the mix of goods and services 
(output) available to society), and “Procedural” ones (aimed at altering the policy  
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process rather than the content) (cited in Eliadis et.al 2005:34), we are here mainly 
concerned with the latter. It seems that the debate of pro’s and con’s of devolution 
does not lack participants – while the investigation of why it really occur in the 
first place, is less thoroughly conducted.  
Horns Model 
In his book “The political economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice 
in the public sector” (1995) Horn presents a transaction-cost model which relates 
variables in the following manner: 
The degree of conflict is manifested through the legislative costs (LC) of 
controlling an agency. As political conflict is thus defined as conflict between 
political parties, it should further be understood as a representation of the divide in 
public opinion. 
The legislative costs, can only be decreased – through increased delegation (D>0) 
to independent bodies (removing responsibility from parliament). This however, 
will increase the agency costs (AC), which are the monetary transfers from 
government to the agency\company. To be able to control these costs, and make 
sure that policy comes out in the right manner, procedural rules and regulation (P) 
is imposed on the agency (“Police patrols and fire alarms” to use the wording of 
Mccubbins and Schwartz (1984)).  
As is then evident, LC and AC are balanced through D and P. What is then further 
obvious, is that increases in LC, justifies increases in D and P – which means that 
higher level of conflict – results in higher levels of delegation and potentially also 
regulation.  
Said in brief and simple wording, Horns hypothesis is that; high degree of 
political conflict, makes parliament representatives ‘push’ the task of governance 
(decision-making power) to an independent body. Such a delegation is further 
assumed to necessitate increased regulation towards the body one chooses to 
delegate to. 
Needless to say, a confirmatory answer to Horns question would illuminate a 
serious flaw in current democratic systems and its corporate governance. 
Especially concerning bodies operating within the sphere of healthcare/social 
services. 
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By bringing in the variable of Conflict, we are able to better include sociological 
aspects of institutional choice and delegation – as it indirectly measures interests 
of politicians in the legislature. We are no longer only concerned with which 
functional needs which created the institutional arrangements of a SOC, but also 
which interests. 
 
If it is true, as Thatcher and others (such as Horn) claim; that delegation is in some 
instances a; “Scapegoat for hard choices” (Thatcher and Sweet 2002:9), it is 
evident that the functionalist logic does not explain the full picture.  
“Not surprisingly: our studies show that elected officials in Europe have 
delegated in order to resolve various collective action problems” (Thatcher and 
Sweet 2002:9) 
The fact that the predictions of Horns model, is confirmed by Thatcher and 
Sweets findings, confirms that it is able to capture some of the sociological factors 
and feedback effects which are not captured by classic functionalist theory. 
However, as mentioned earlier – the functionalist explanation should not be 
forgotten on this basis, but rather complimented with an analysis of the decision-
making creating the definitions of a ‘good’ function – to illuminate whether it is 
mostly based on ideology or political strategy. 
 
As mentioned time and again now, this paper will therefore aim at using elements 
from both approaches. An advantage of such a model is (amongst other things) 
that it should be more able to deal with so-called “feedback effects”, which occur 
when the agents behaviour is informing its principal, and affecting his\her choice 
on future delegation and regulation. As parliament see changes in agency 
spending, or in barometers of public opinion – it will surely affect their opinion on 
the governance of the specific firm. This relates to the corporate governance 
literature, which identifies that ‘policy trends’ also seems to play a vital role.  
As is now evident, this research topic relates to a huge number of theoretical 
camps – all united under the common umbrella of public administration. The 
impact of all the different theories will depend on the results produced by our 
model. 
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If Horns expected correlations are strong, functionalist explanations must be given 
less space – but while the contrary would lead us to emphasize sociologic and 
deliberative explanations. My model will thus try to combine this modern 
transaction cost approach, with more classical explanations – to investigate which 
effects are stronger, and if there is a potential interplay between them. As far as I 
am informed, this is the first time someone tests Horns model on empirical data.  
Applying Horn to Norway 
After reading Horns book, several question marks were left on my retinal. First of 
all, would such a theory fly if tested on empirics - and secondly, how would such 
results vary amongst countries? The question of whether to organize a certain task 
through parliament, public administration or through a state-owned company is a 
major part of the puzzle of who gets what from legislation. If it is true that 
political strategy is the main defining feature of the politician’s choice, this 
obviously has dramatic consequences. This is certainly the case in Norway, where 
the degree of state-ownership and control of private companies is extraordinarily 
common (see next section), and where quasi-autonomous agencies can be tracked 
back to the 1850’s (Christensen and Lægreid 2006:21), and where state ownership 
is widely conceived as an employment-tool (Esping Andersen1990:157-159). 
Though never attempted before, this research paper will therefore use Norway as 
an empirical ground for testing Horns hypothesis.  
Horns hypothesis is based on the American  two-party bicameral system, where 
congress is divided into a House and a Senate – representing less and more 
national and local impacts of legislation, on a shorter and longer election cycle. In 
the U.S state ownership is not as common as in Norway, as the economy as a 
whole is more liberal.  
The Norwegian economy is usually characterized as a ’mixed economy’ – with a 
(liberal) capitalist market as platform, but quite extensive state ownership and 
control (planned economy). The latter exposes itself through taxes, surcharges, 
subsidies, concessions as well as labor-, environmental- and regional policy. 
This is interesting for a number of reasons. Not only are the U.S and Norwegian 
systems separate by being a parliamentary and a presidential democracy – but the 
structure of public administration also has major differences. Even more 
interesting are the cultural differences: It should be fair to state that in Norway,  
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 23 
 
state intervention in the economy is far more accepted than in the U.S.  
In an imprecise manner, one could claim that the divide in attitudes towards 
regulation is expressed in a good manner by the two populations’ common 
conception of the term “socialism”. In Norway, such a term seems to have a 
positive sign, while in the U.S it seems close to ‘communism’. It is in this respect 
that the results of my analysis are expected to yield certain contradictions or 
moderations of Horns hypothesis. Why is this? Well, when the population 
supports state intervention to a larger extent – government enterprises can be 
legitimized not only through economical arguments, but to a larger extent also 
through sociological and functionalist logics such as employment and sector 
policy. That is; when proposing to establish or strengthen an independent body, 
the legislator must use functionalist rather than economic arguments in order to 
get approval.  
Another effect is that politicians can reduce ‘legislative costs’ not only through 
increased delegation, but also through legitimizing the unpopular actions – by 
referring to the important societal effect which the ‘unpopular’ decisions are 
creating.  At the same time - the strong culture for consensus in the Norwegian 
parliament – will most likely increase Horns LC variable, as bargaining takes 
more time. This mechanism however, also ensures that final decisions to delegate 
(or not) is based on a qualitative debate considering functional aspects, in a 
deliberative forum which reduces the ability to follow ‘private’ preferences. The 
size of this effect depends on the type of government (unitary or coalition), and 
the amount of ‘universalism’5
 
 going on in parliament. 
The Norwegian ownership structure 
The ownership-structure in the Norwegian economy separates itself from most 
other European states, as the size of public sector ownership s supersedes them all 
(NHO: 2006).  Reasons for this could be several. Firstly, the NPM wave of 
liberalization in the 90’s hit Norway in a different manner than many other 
European states. Rather than a full privatization, many tasks were moved to state 
owned companies and independent administrative bodies, ensuring some  
 
                                                 
5 ’Universalism’ here refers to the culture for approving proposals of your competitor, in order to have 
him/her approve yours. This ‘I scratch your back, you scratch mine’ mentality increases  
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continuation of political control (NHO:2006). This can partially be explained by 
strong ideological resistance within the population, and the fact that systems were 
largely seen as working well within the public administration.   
Historically, Norwegian state owned companies  have been industry-companies 
within the transport sector (Christensen et.al 2010). Another reason for the high 
number of state-owned companies  stems from the fact that the savings volume in 
the Norwegian economy is largely provided by government – and not the 
individual, as the state provides a vast spectrum of social services, including the 
pensions-savings system. This is intertwined with the fact that the state governs 
the vast majority of revenues from the petroleum sector. Thus the Norwegian state 
plays an important part as provider of capital in the economy, which manifests 
itself through, amongst other things, a high amount of state-owned enterprises. 
Through its portfolio of over 80 companies, The Norwegian state governs the 
workplace of more than 280 000 employees, approximately 10% of the total labor 
force6
Using the model as a unifying tool 
 (NHO:2006). 
In stead of analyzing the relationship between parliament and administrative 
bodies only (as Horn sketched), I wish to test the same model on both them, and 
government enterprises – to see if the choice of organizing a government 
enterprise out of a former administrative body, is related to the  level of political 
conflict in the sector. Devolution might in this respect relate not only to high or 
low levels of economic liberalization – but also to the preferences of politicians, 
and their wish to avoid troublesome and unpopular decisions. 
 
According to Horn, it would be logical to assume that; the more conflict 
surrounding an enterprise, the lower the intensity of public governance. Due to the 
country differences considered in the preceding sections, my predictions are 
somehow contrary. I predict that the administrative bodies are the ones with the 
highest degree of intensity of public governance (as they are regulated under 
public law), but that these are also the bodies surrounded by the most conflict 
(Hypothesis 4 further down). If true, this shows that other factors than ‘populist’  
                                                 
6 The total labor force (in age-range 16-74) in the third quarter of 2010, was estimated to approximately 2 
600 000 (SSB, Table 03777; “Personer i arbeidsstyrken, etter kjønn og alder”) 
  
 
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 25 
 
ones should be investigated. In other words; that government seems to liberalize 
only when they rest assured that there are no critical political issues at hand in the 
process of controlling the company. 
 
Horns  transaction cost approach provides a unifying tool – a single model 
explaining institutional regularities across the public sector, by collaborating all 
sociological and  psychological effects assumed to reside within decision-makers, 
into a common term of noise, namely ‘legislative costs’, while also capturing 
structural characteristics of sectors\enterprises. 
The risk one is running by applying such a model however – as is the problem of 
most economic models - is that the image might be to simplified. After having 
tested Horns model on Norwegian empirics, the thesis therefore tries to - 
influenced by scholarly camps of functionalism, institutionalism, organizational 
theory, corporate governance, and the general public administration literature – 
investigate to what extent characteristics of the specific institutions 
(administrative bodies or state-owned companies) and the environment in which 
they operate, are also important factors in the development of its design.  
The expected image drawn by the research papers results is that country-specific 
attributes matter more than emphasized by Horn – and that corporatist and 
deliberative attitudes in Scandinavia make the allover fit of Horns model quite 
poor. It is however expected to find a fairly good correlation between different 
indicators of ‘conflict’ surrounding sectors and the bodies operating within them – 
which proves that there is a pattern of more or less ‘legislative costs’ connected to 
different firms/administrative bodies. This shows that Horns argument should not 
be completely erased from the chart, as reality is probably best described through 
a hybrid of models. This paper can be viewed as a first attempt to build this 
hybrid. 
 
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 26 
 
 
Analysis 
The selection of institutions: 
The companies and institutions in the data-set represents a broad selection of 
public bodies, from administrative bodies providing infrastructure for the armed 
forces, to pure stock-noted businesses selling services within transportation, 
financial services, electricity etc.  
The main focus however - has been to investigate institutions which administrates 
politicized tasks – rather than private and economical ones. Thus the majority of 
the sample consists of companies which the government themselves claim to own 
due to the safeguarding of sector-political tasks (so called category 4 companies) 
and administrative bodies (Category 5). The more business oriented ones are 
considered primarily as a comparison. 
The choice of selection is based on a number of factors, primarily; legal basis, 
task-orientation and to some extent data availability. For instance, companies such 
as Simula, Bjørnøen and Itas Amb was initially included in the dataset, but had to 
be excluded due to missing data in their annual reports and questionnaires. 
The companies included in the final analysis represent small as well as very large 
institutions – and should serve as a broad and representative selection. Besides the 
administrative bodies (category 5), the selection represents 31 of approximately 
80 Norwegian state owned companies. All together, 47 institutions are 
investigated. 
Hypotheses’: 
Based on Horns above mentioned publication, and the reviewed literature 
suggestions, three main hypotheses’ will be tested: 
 
H1: Enterprises and administrative bodies with higher degree of conflict 
surrounding them (in parliament, government and media) – will have less intense 
governance, that is; more autonomy. 
H2: There is a linear relationship between the amount of conflict surrounding an 
enterprise \ institution and its size (employees and turnover). 
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H3: The intensity of governance will also depend on a range of enterprise 
characteristics, such as the amount of subsidiaries (+), its exposure to competition 
(-) and its size (-), with a causal direction similar to the one noted in the 
parentheses above. 
H4: The closer an enterprise’s legal basis shifts towards an administrative body 
(Cat 5), the higher the conflict and thus the higher intensity. 
 
Discussions of competitions role in regulating SOEs has does not lack in the 
literature (see for instance Saynor 1987, Lioukas and Papoulias 1990, Aharoni 
1986, Domberger and Piggot 1986 or Kay and Thompson 1986).  
The general conception is that those enterprises which are highly exposed to 
competition are also more autonomous, as effective market responses require both 
speed and special competences (Lioukas et.al 1993).  
 
The same relationship is expected for size, as the larger a company gets, the less 
the ministry is able to impose controls. Some places in the literature (such as in 
Lioukas et.al (1993)), an opposite relationship is expected due to size’s effect on 
conflict (or as they term it; ‘visibility’). 
Building the model 
As far as I am informed, no one has ever attempted this before, and as Horn had 
only created a general transaction cost model, translating this into a research 
model had to be done from scratch.  
The main goal of such a research model would be to measure some sort of relation 
amongst the degree of political conflict and the degree of intensity of governance 
surrounding a state owned company. Such a confirmatory approach made it 
essential to start off with a model, and more or less stick to it – regardless of the 
data. I therefore start off with explaining the build-up of the model and its 
indicators, before we review the output of bivariate correlations between 
indicators. 
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The X-model 
The first step was thus to build a theoretical construct of “conflict”.  
This was done through the use of three different indicators, namely (i) the amount 
of written summaries, recommendations and questions treated in parliament – 
concerning the selected companies (PARLCONF), (ii) the amount of written 
proposals, studies (NOU) and messages concerning the companies, which has 
been treated by the government (GOVCONF) and (iii) the amount of politically 
loaded media appearances containing the company name (MEDIA)7
 
.  
 
Before moving on to the Y-model, the latter indicator should be further explained: 
Indicator ’Media’ 
The ‘media’ indicator is based on data bought from the Norwegian media 
monitoring enterprise “Retriever”. The indicator measures the total number of 
appearances of (Company Name* AND (“Member of Parliament”* OR 
“Representative in Parliament” OR “deputy representative in Parliament” OR  
“Minister”)) in the time period of 1990-2010. The search was conducted in all 
national written media – with the use of the full company names, including 
“.INC” “.Corp” etc. 
The search string was built in this manner, to be able to avoid the general media 
publicity concerning ‘trivial’ issues such as interviews with employee of the 
month or articles on popular internships etc - and rather capturing the politically 
loaded appearances. 
The results has further been skimmed through, to make sure that such ‘trivial’ and  
                                                 
7 A more thorough explanation of the different indicators is provided later in the Analysis section. 
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unrelated media appearances are not included. Another reason for this is the fact 
that some company names has a more or less general wording, which could 
include irrelevant results (For instance, the company name “Innovation Norway” 
– easily could yield higher scores whenever a MP commented on innovation in 
Norway, without actually mentioning the company). 
The data correlates strongly with the other indicators of conflict (PARLCONF and 
GOVCONF) and thus seems like a valid measure of the amount of “attention” a 
company gets\demands.  However, it is important to balance this indicator with 
the two previously mentioned – as appearances can be both of positive and 
negative character, thus not directly measuring Legislative Costs, which was 
Horns departure.  
 
As shown below, the factor analysis proved these indicators to correlate quite 
remarkably, and thus have good internal consistency. That is; those companies 
which have high degree of conflict in one of the three arenas – also has a high 
level of conflict in the others. 
:         
MEDIA 1   
PARLCONF .472 1  
GOVCONF .656 .560 1 
 
The Y-Model 
Having established a good measure of political ‘conflict’, a construct representing 
“Intensity of political governance” would have to be created. This was far more 
difficult than the latter construct, as measures of control are challenging and 
widely debated. Scholars often separate between formal and informal controls, or 
controls used before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) wanted actions. Others, such as 
Beesley et al. (1986), suggest four categories of control, namely: (i) controls on 
the scope of activities, (ii) controls on the mobilization of resources, (iii) controls 
on operations and (iv) evaluative controls. Things are further complicated through 
the fact that the state can impose controls both as owner and buyer. Choosing 
indicators should both consider measurability and validity. 
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Here, the choice was to use four indicators, namely (i) the length of the 
companies’ mission statements (PARGLEN), (ii) a dichotomous variable 
measuring the existence or non-existence of a §10 (stating that all significant 
investments and future planning should be presented to parliament) (PAR10), (iii) 
the legal basis of the company8 (LEGBAS) (which is the more common measure 
of devolution), and (iv) questionnaire data mapping the 47 investigated 
companies’ >230 board members own conceptions of governance intensity 
(COIBRD)9
 
. 
While the former four indicators of intensity are rather straight forward, the latter 
indicator deserves some extra attention; 
Indicator: Conception of intensity 
The ‘conception of intensity’ (COI) variable is expected to measure respectively 
the board members and the CEO’s conceptions of their ‘liberties’ in respect to the 
ministry. The variable is constructed on the basis of questionnaire-data from a 
survey conducted amongst all the state-owned enterprises in the summer of 
201010
 
. The respondents are amongst other things asked to rank the degree of 
freedom (1, very high – 4, very low) they conceive when carrying out different 
parts of their mandate, such as quality-improvements, cost-cuts, HR relations,  
                                                 
8 Ranging from state owned stock noted company (1), public limited company (2), special law 
company (3) state enterprise (4) to administrative body (5). 
9 A more thorough explanation of the indicators can be found later in the Analysis part, and the 
data are located in the appendix. 
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financial matters and so forth11
Another question relates to the board members’ fear of being (or actual 
confidence in not being) publicly criticized, punished, or at worst fired as a 
consequence of not reaching their set goals. The higher their ‘fears’, the higher the 
conception of intense governance. Respondents are also asked to rank the ministry 
as an active or passive owner – and we map whether they have the impression that 
larger cases must be presented to the owner before decisions, or on the other end 
of the scale – that the owners role is limited to the general assembly. All the 
questions from the questionnaire can be found in the appendix. 
. As the aggregated average of board members 
rankings yields high values – the higher the value of the ‘conception of intensity’ 
becomes. 
The COI indicator is assumed to correlate positively with the dependent IOG 
construct, as a “high conception of intensity” would indicate that intensity is 
actually high. However, it is clear that this effect strongly relies on subjective 
considerations – and preferences of the respondents. Thus, this indicator forces us 
to trust the image drawn by board members and CEO’s, and should thus only 
serve as a co-indicator next to structural measures. 
 
The correlation between the intensity indicators showed to be a bit less internally 
consistent than the ones measuring conflict. This should however be expected as 
the number or indicators is higher. The main findings here is the following; as 
companies are less business oriented – more employees are (in average) found in 
the boards. Less business oriented companies also seem to have more extensive 
mission statements. On a subjective side note, they also seem to be less specific. 
Board members in business oriented companies seem to feel less governed than 
those in companies with sector specific tasks.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
10 71% of all boardmembers in the companies answered. For the companies in this paper, this 
yields  N>230 
11 Question 21.1-21.8 in the questionnaire which can be found in the appendix 
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 legbas  emplbrd parglen par10 coiboard 
legbas  1     
emplbrd -.243 1    
parglen -.359 -,101 1   
par10 .671 ,302 -.644  1  
coiboard -.380 -,083 .495 -.417 1 
 
Now, let’s have a look at the total model which these data generates: 
 
Model 1 (Isolated model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The resulting model looks as shown above. As expected, conflict negatively 
affects intensity through a negative relationship. This would have been the perfect 
model had it not been for two things; (i) The isolated model discriminates all 
spurious effects and thus (ii) The statistical fit is very poor. Neglecting this for 
now however12, the estimates should be interpreted in the following manner: 
Having a §10, being closer towards public administration than company, or 
having many employees in the board – are measures of higher intensity of 
governance. A long mission statement or a high conception of intensity amongst 
board members are signs of lower intensity. The latter could easily be 
misinterpreted however, as results here go in opposite direction of expected. That 
is, those feeling most intensely governed – are actually not those companies who  
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are (according to the legal and structural aspects of the company) experiencing 
high intensity of governance. We’ll get back to this momentarily. 
For now, I finish the explanation of these temporary results by noting that 
increases in media conflict, government conflict and parliamentary conflict all 
increase the ‘conflict’ construct. 
Important note to the model 
The potential flaw of this model is the possibility of inversed causality. It might 
just be that the increased media attention for some companies – is present namely 
because of their less intensive governance (as a criticism of this). However, as the 
MEDIA indicator correlates so well with the ones of GOVCONF and 
PARLCONF – which is not assumed to be exposed to such a threat, I have found 
it safe to rule this inversed causality out. This can now be confirmed, as the 
companies with the highest conception of intensive governance, are all in the 
medium\high range of media appearances. 
Imposing Control variables 
Even though measures of conflict and intensity seem reliable for the purpose, it is 
obvious that a range of spurious effects are present. To control this, a range of 
other variables were considered, which might affect the relative degree of 
intensity in governance: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual model. 
                                                                                                                                     
12 Further developments of the model avaits. 
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• First of all, it might have been the case that companies recently established 
would be governed tighter than those who had been around for 100 years. 
In fact, also the opposite might have been the case, thus year of 
establishment (ESTABL) seemed a proper control variable.  
• Secondly, it was thought that even though the governments own 
categorization of firms (1-4) was only a subjective scale created to guide 
and legitimize governance – it might in fact affect the governance 
structure (CAT) 
•  Thirdly, it seemed that which ministry governing the respective 
companies should be considered as  an obvious reason for differences in 
intensity (OWNER) 
• The location of the companies headquarters might affect the ministry’s 
ability to govern (LOCA) 
• The size of the company, measured in terms of turnover (SIZE 2) and 
manyears (SIZE 1) – might also affect both the ministry’s ability and wish 
to govern. 
• A ‘competition index’ was implemented, to measure the businesses’ 
exposure to market competition. This index was borrowed from professor 
Rune J. Sørensens research project on Norwegian State owned companies 
(2011), and can be found in the appendix. 
• In addition, a Position in Hierarchy (PIH) variable was constructed, which 
is described in more detail below. 
Indicator: PIH 
The ’Position in Hierarchy’ (PIH) indicator, is a measure of how many 
independent subsidiaries exists underneath each enterprise. The logic of this 
measure can be found in the name of the indicator – namely to map the extent to 
which the board and the CEO of a company has independent control of other 
boards and budgets, thus placing them in the middle – rather than the bottom of a 
hierarchy. Being yielded the rights to control subsidiaries is in the first place 
expected to indicate larger degree of freedom (lower intensity), as the alternative 
would have been for the ministry to control these daughter-companies themselves.   
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Further, the amount of subsidiaries is also expected to say something about the 
SOE’s ability to set claims and demands vis-à-vis their owner. Moving back to the 
main hypothesis, this is to say that those companies surrounded by a lot of 
negative conflict – would to a larger extent be operating their own subsidiaries. 
 
The correlations amongst the control variables, or ‘characteristics’ as I have called 
the group – looks as following: 
 
 Category Owner Location Establ PIH Manyrs Cost08 
category 1       
owner .711 1      
location .284 .223 1     
establ -.362 -.345 -.399 1    
PIH .146 .181 -.114 -.392 1   
manyrs -.191 -.225 -.220 -161 -.023 1  
Cost08 -.255 -.241 -.284 -.062 .163 .852 1 
 
As can be witnessed, no clear patterns emerge – but year of establishment seems 
to correlate fairly well with several variables, indicating that trends have been 
causing characteristic differences between firms. Also, quite obviously; there is a 
strong relationship between the amount of employees (MANYRS) and the 
operational costs of companies. Lastly, we also observe that certain ministries 
seem to govern certain enterprises in terms of category (pure businesspublic 
administration). 
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Model 2 (with controls) 
The structuring of the second model was based on the following pattern matrix 
derived from a factor analysis based on estimation of Maximum Likelihood: 
Pattern Matrixa 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
COIBOARD     .311     
PARGLEN   .260   -.661   
PAR10   .578   .318 .279 
LEGBAS       -.642   
EMPLBRD       .433   
MEDIA .790         
PARLCONF .901       -.328 
GOVCONF .701         
CAT     .758     
OWNER -.419   .876     
ESTABL         .662 
PIH         -.636 
COMP -.281 .285 -.782     
MANYRS   .889       
COST08   .959     -.283 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
The results with controls included looks as following; 
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As can be seen – the model fit is better, but still not close to a good fit. T-values 
of most X-model indicators are quite low, and the suppression of error terms in 
some of them hides important latent effects. 
 
Based on the statistical goodness-of-fit tests, the model must be rejected, and with 
it the hypothesis that conflict affects intensity. However, even though the model 
cannot be generalized – it will tell us something about the relative importance of 
the different indicators in this very case. And as almost half of Norwegian State-
Owned companies are included in the data-set, it still says quite a lot about trends, 
even though it cannot be statistically generalized through this model.  
 
Model 3 (with controls, allowing ε of size and conflict covary) 
Having investigated the above shown model and the initial correlation matrixes up 
and down - it eventually started to become clear what was disturbing the data. 
The fact that size of companies would affect strongly both conflict and 
governance, it needed to be modeled as an underlying effect of both. To 
accomplish this, the characteristics had to be merged into a single variable (less 
overview but still a common control variable), to be able to let free the error 
terms, and thus let the ones of our “size” indicators covary with indicators 
measuring conflict. Notice how this captures the indirect effect of size through 
conflict in a much better manner. Notice also how radically the RMSEA is altered. 
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The model fit is still marginally outside the area of good fit, but radically closer. 
It thus seemed a step in the right direction. By removing four of the outlier 
companies, the result could further be pushed towards a statistical fit of; 
 
For the same model13
 
, which is at least within the RMSEA fit criterias (Jöreskog 
and Sörbom 1993)  
Further manipulation of the model would be possible, but then I would be 
neglecting the initial goal of a confirmatory analysis based on Horns variables. 
Further steps which could be made to improve the model would have to be linked 
to experimentation amongst alternative indicators. Based on this framework 
however, this is as far as we get. We construct a model which marginally fits the 
data, but the variation amongst companies makes the fit hard to improve. 
This is not to say though, that the model and its underlying correlations does not 
tell us anything. After having a look at the ‘conflict’ rating amongst companies, 
the results section will make this obvious. 
 
Who gets conflict? 
Below, a list of all the investigated institutions is sorted by an aggregated14
 
 
conflict ranking 
By MEDIA By PARLCONF By GOVCONF Aggregated 
 
    1. Statisti NSB AS NSB AS UIB 
2.  UIB Innovasj UIB Statisti 
3.  Innovasj Husbanke Avinor A NSB AS 
4.  Husbanke Posten N Norges T Innovasj 
5.  NSB AS Statens Statisti Husbanke 
6.  Statens Avinor A Høgskole Avinor A 
7.  Posten N AS Vinmo Electron Posten N 
8.  Høgskole Statens Posten N Statens 
9.  Rikskons Norsk Ti Statens Norges T 
10.  Forsvare Havforsk Statens Høgskole 
11.  Statens Statisti Havforsk Statens 
12.  Havforsk UIB Forsvare Havforsk 
13.  Norges T Norges T Simula R Forsvare 
14.  Meteorol Forsvars Innovasj AS Vinmo 
15.  Høgskole Kommunal Meteorol Norsk Ti 
16.  Norsk Ti Statkraf Høgskole Electron 
17.  Høgskole Statskog Husbanke Meteorol 
18.  Norfund Statnett AS Vinmo Forsvars 
19.  Flytoget Forsvare Norsk sa Statkraf 
20.  Forsvars Høgskole Norsk Ti Kommunal 
                                                 
13 See ”Syntax for model3 with 43 companies” 
14 Values of all three ’conflict’ indicators added together. 
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21.  AS Vinmo Flytoget Statkraf Statnett 
22.  Avinor A Eksportf Forsvars Statskog 
23.  Statkraf SIVA SF Statnett Høgskole 
24.  Kings Ba Meteorol Store No Rikskons 
25.  Riksteat Store No Kommunal Flytoget 
26.  Petoro A Norsk Ri Statskog Eksportf 
27.  Statnett Norfund Høgskole Store No 
28.  Mesta Ko Petoro A Norsk Ri Norsk Ri 
29.  Norsk Ri Norsk Ei Eksportf Norfund 
30.  Entra Ei Kings Ba Rikskons SIVA SF 
31.  Eksportf Electron SIVA SF Simula R 
32.  Finansti Gassco A Kings Ba Høgskole 
33.  Enova SF Entra Ei Flytoget Kings Ba 
34.  Statskog Enova SF Norsk Ei Petoro A 
35.  SIVA SF Høgskole Norfund Norsk sa 
36.  Gassco A Rikskons Petoro A Norsk Ei 
37.  Gassnova UNINETT Gassco A Gassco A 
38.  Kommunal Norsk sa Entra Ei Entra Ei 
39.  Electron Høgskole Enova SF Enova SF 
40.  Store No Vetrinær UNINETT UNINETT 
41.  Norsk He Finansti Finansti Finansti 
42.  Norsk sa Riksteat Vetrinær Vetrinær 
43.  Universi Gassnova Universi Riksteat 
44.  Simula R Universi Gassnova Universi 
45.  UNINETT Simula R Norsk He Gassnova 
46.  Vetrinær Norsk He Riksteat Norsk He 
47.  Norsk Ei Mesta Ko Mesta Ko Mesta Ko 
 
The conflict ranking more or less confirms the ‘size-matters more’ hypothesis, 
exept from certain cases. “Husbanken”, which is a quite small\medium sized 
Norwegian SOE, seems to receive a lot of attention both in parliament and the 
media. Another exception from the rule is Innovasjon Norge, which is far from the 
largest companies (even though having a medium plus sized budget it is still small 
in comparison with far less conflicted institutions). Another institution which is 
surprising to see at the top of the list is the University of Bergen. 
Besides these cases, all the largest companies; NSB AS, Avinor AS, Posten Norge 
AS seems to help confirm the hypothesis stated in model 3.  
 
Results 
In the initial model, the effects of conflict on intensity seemed quite strong. 
Companies with a lot of ‘political turbulence’ seemed to be governed in a 
weaker\more distant manner, than those with less attention.   
When including other parameters into the analysis however, it becomes clear that 
almost the entire influence was based upon spurious effects. Further, it was only 
after allowing for interplay between size and conflict (model 3) that were able to 
find a statistical fit. This is similar to results obtained by Lioukas et.al (1993). 
The larger a company gets (measured in terms of man-years and operational costs) 
the higher the degree of conflict surrounding it – especially in parliament.  
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This is an obvious finding, as the big fish is always the one people talk about. 
Partially due to taxpayer concerns, partially due to employment issues, and 
partially as part of the economic debate on GDP and growth.  
Thus it seems that even though Horns hypothesis seems valid at first glance, the 
underlying causality of devolution and weakened governance should (as opposed 
to Horns (1995) and Thatcher and Sweet’s (2002) expectations) be derived from 
other sources than blame avoidance. It seems, that conflict can be derived from 
size – while not being directly linked to intensity. In other words, the larger 
companies have higher legislative costs and media attention, but this does not 
leave them under weak governance.  
Comments to findings: 
Without knowing the coding of data, the model might not yield much intuitive 
insight, as signs are mixed for each and every indicator. Going back to the 
bivariate correlation matrix of all the initial variables however, the following 
findings can be commented: 
 
Both the board members’ and the CEO’s conceptions of intensity seems to be 
fairly well correlated with the type of category, legal basis and purpose-paragraph 
of their company, which is natural – as these are the company characteristics 
which define the formal relationship between ministries and themselves. This 
matches classical functionalist theory presented above. Besides these variables 
however, the conceptions of the board members (COIBOARD) doesn’t really 
seem to correlate significantly with anything. Board members thus seem to base 
their conceptions of intensity on structural characteristics of the company, rather 
than external media attention or political conflict. This is an interesting finding in 
itself. 
 
 
PARGLE
N PAR10 LEGBAS 
COIBOARD Pearson Correlation  .495** -.417** -.380** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .004 .008 
N  47 47 47 
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The CEO’s conceptions of intensity however, has positive and significant 
correlation with the amount of employees represented in the board, which seems 
natural, as higher demands on employee representation, yields less power to the 
CEO – due to regulations from the ministry. Further, CEO’s in rural areas seems 
to feel more intensely governed than those in major cities. These latter findings 
should however be received with caution, as approximately 50% of the companies 
have their seat in Oslo. 
 
The amount of subsidiaries (PIH index) seems to be stronger correlated to the age 
of the company than the lever of conflict. There is a fairly strong negative 
relationship (-.392* ) between the PIH index and the year of establishment 
(ESTABL). The main pattern is thus that older companies seem to have more 
subsidiaries than newer ones. This makes it possible to assume that ‘trends’ of 
devolution plays an important role, which fits most of the public administration 
literature (see for instance Christopher Hood’s “A public management for all 
seasons” on NPM and post-NPM theory (1999)) 
 
It seems to be of quite some importance which ministry is in charge of the 
respective company. However, as ministries are only coded with nominal numbers 
between 1 and 15, this specific analysis cannot say anything about which ministry 
is stricter than the other. However, as NHD controls a major part of the sampled 
companies – and has the coding 1, the quite significant negative correlation will 
tell us that those not in their portfolio are governed with more slack. This could be 
interpreted as a sign that experience matters, as predicted by Seversky (1982)15
 
. 
Another interesting finding is that also the amount of political media attention 
surrounding a company, seems to be connected with which ministry is controlling 
it. The ministries least experienced with ownership seem to be the worst off. 
However, the interpretation of these data should also be performed cautiously, as 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD) controls over half (19 out of 32) of the 
investigated companies, and the categorical numbering is randomly given.  
 
                                                 
15 Described previously in the theory section 
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Further; in accordance with functionalist theory - the paragraph length increases 
as the legal basis shifts from State Corporation towards public administration. It 
should also be noted that ‘all’ the companies with a §10 seems to have more 
‘conflict’ than others. This finding cannot exactly be ‘generalized’ however, as 
only three16
 
 of the investigated companies have it (all amongst the largest 
companies in the selection). 
Without yielding much new insight, the fact that our competition index has strong 
negative correlation with company category, legal basis and ownership – shows 
that the model is composed in a logical manner – in terms of capturing real world 
effects. The reason that these companies are categorized and run the way that they 
are – is their differences in exposure to competition. Thus such a strong (-.645, -
.502) negative correlation is indeed a ‘must’.  
 
One of the most significant variables in the whole dataset, was unexpectedly the 
one of ‘manyears’. This was the reason why a coupling of size and conflict was 
seen necessary. 
The amount of employees seems to positively affect; 
 
a) The amount of employees in the board 
b) The amount of media attention 
c) The amount of parliamentary conflict 
d) The amount of government conflict 
e) Whether or not a §10 is imposed (all three §10 companies belong to the 
top 3 in size) 
The indication that ‘size matters’ is confirmed by the fact that the volume of 
operating costs (in 2006 and 2008 respectively) seems to correlate strongly with 
both MEDIA, PARLCONF and GOVCONF. 
It thus seems that the larger the companies are – both in respect to budget 
(taxpayer money) and manyears (employment) – the more it gets into conflict. 
This was the ‘obvious’ finding expected before running the regressions. The 
larger companies have a higher degree of profiling. This neither yields new  
                                                 
16 NRK AS, NSB AS, Posten Norge AS 
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knowledge, but confirms our measures being meaningful. It also tells us that the 
size of the company, both in terms of manyears and turnover – is partially causing 
both the level of conflict and intensity. Thus it seems that size matters more than 
task. 
Another interesting finding is the fact that CEO and board member benefits are 
higher in companies with high parliamentary conflict and many political media 
appearances – but this might as well be due to the size of the company (CEO 
benefits correlates even stronger with manyears). In any case, one might assume 
from this pattern that increased responsibility yields increased bonuses. Benefits 
also seem to vary significantly amongst ministries. 
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Conclusion: 
Conclusively, one can state that the model in large captures fractions of reality in 
which it is set out to do. However, it can not be seen as strong enough to support 
Horns ‘depolitization thesis’. Rather it provides a good macro-view on the arena 
between ministries and state owned companies in Norway, which illustrates the 
importance of size hidden in conflict. An increasing company size however, will 
undoubtedly create increases in legislative costs – and if one were to dictate Horns 
predictions, this would lead these larger company’s to be governed in a slacker 
manner. These results however – show the opposite effect. The most evident 
explanation for this is the fact that while costs is a burden, employment is a 
benefit. The reason for political conflict can be derived at the same place as the 
reasoning for strengthened governance, namely turnover and manyears – and the 
stake it creates. In other words; budget isn’t always seen as the only guideline in 
corporate governance. This is not to say that political conflict does not affect 
governance (cause we have just seen that it does), but rather that conflict can push 
in both directions. 
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Appendix 
Bivariate Correlation Matrix: All variables 
Correlations 
 
COIBOARD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA 
COIBOARD Pearson Correlation 1 .495** -.417** -.380** -.083 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .004 .008 .669 .982 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
PARGLEN Pearson Correlation .495** 1 -.644** -.359* -.101 -.306* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .013 .603 .037 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
PAR10 Pearson Correlation -.417** -.644** 1 .671** .302 .427** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000  .000 .111 .003 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
LEGBAS Pearson Correlation -.380** -.359* .671** 1 -.243 .320* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .013 .000  .204 .028 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
EMPLBRD Pearson Correlation -.083 -.101 .302 -.243 1 .083 
Sig. (2-tailed) .669 .603 .111 .204  .668 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 
MEDIA Pearson Correlation -.003 -.306* .427** .320* .083 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .982 .037 .003 .028 .668  
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
PARLCONF Pearson Correlation .065 -.225 .309* .065 .257 .472** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .666 .128 .034 .662 .178 .001 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
GOVCONF Pearson Correlation -.014 -.281 .436** .126 .197 .566** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .925 .056 .002 .400 .304 .000 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
CAT Pearson Correlation -.263 -.382** .600** .720** -.110 .267 
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .008 .000 .000 .570 .069 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
OWNER Pearson Correlation -.261 -.348* .546** .541** .045 .151 
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .017 .000 .000 .818 .310 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
ESTABL Pearson Correlation .089 .382** -.341* -.314* -.186 -.485** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .561 .010 .022 .036 .334 .001 
N 45 45 45 45 29 45 
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 52 
PIH Pearson Correlation .092 .032 -.055 .046 .170 -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .622 .866 .770 .808 .377 .932 
N 31 31 31 31 29 31 
COMP Pearson Correlation -.117 .043 -.181 -.348* -.068 -.161 
Sig. (2-tailed) .434 .773 .224 .016 .727 .279 
N 47 47 47 47 29 47 
MANYRS Pearson Correlation .107 .020 .328 -.241 .353 .177 
Sig. (2-tailed) .535 .908 .051 .157 .077 .303 
N 36 36 36 36 26 36 
COST08 Pearson Correlation -.020 .038 .204 -.355* .294 .096 
Sig. (2-tailed) .910 .825 .233 .034 .137 .576 
N 36 36 36 36 27 36 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 
PARLCONF GOVCONF CAT OWNER ESTABL PIH 
COIBOARD Pearson Correlation .065 -.014 -.263 -.261 .089 .092 
Sig. (2-tailed) .666 .925 .074 .077 .561 .622 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
PARGLEN Pearson Correlation -.225 -.281 -.382** -.348* .382** .032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .128 .056 .008 .017 .010 .866 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
PAR10 Pearson Correlation .309* .436** .600** .546** -.341* -.055 
Sig. (2-tailed) .034 .002 .000 .000 .022 .770 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
LEGBAS Pearson Correlation .065 .126 .720** .541** -.314* .046 
Sig. (2-tailed) .662 .400 .000 .000 .036 .808 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
EMPLBRD Pearson Correlation .257 .197 -.110 .045 -.186 .170 
Sig. (2-tailed) .178 .304 .570 .818 .334 .377 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 
MEDIA Pearson Correlation .472** .566** .267 .151 -.485** -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .069 .310 .001 .932 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
PARLCONF Pearson Correlation 1 .651** .140 -.049 -.267 .254 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .347 .744 .077 .167 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
GOVCONF Pearson Correlation .651** 1 .213 .027 -.132 .011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .151 .856 .387 .954 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
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CAT Pearson Correlation .140 .213 1 .711** -.362* .146 
Sig. (2-tailed) .347 .151  .000 .015 .434 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
OWNER Pearson Correlation -.049 .027 .711** 1 -.345* .181 
Sig. (2-tailed) .744 .856 .000  .020 .331 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
ESTABL Pearson Correlation -.267 -.132 -.362* -.345* 1 -.392* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .387 .015 .020  .029 
N 45 45 45 45 45 31 
PIH Pearson Correlation .254 .011 .146 .181 -.392* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .167 .954 .434 .331 .029  
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 
COMP Pearson Correlation -.162 -.018 -.601** -.470** .086 -.223 
Sig. (2-tailed) .275 .902 .000 .001 .574 .227 
N 47 47 47 47 45 31 
MANYRS Pearson Correlation .381* .395* -.191 -.225 .161 -.023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .022 .017 .263 .186 .363 .908 
N 36 36 36 36 34 27 
COST08 Pearson Correlation .519** .320 -.255 -.241 .062 .163 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .057 .134 .157 .728 .398 
N 36 36 36 36 34 29 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 
COMP MANYRS COST08 
COIBOARD Pearson Correlation -.117 .107 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .434 .535 .910 
N 47 36 36 
PARGLEN Pearson Correlation .043 .020 .038 
Sig. (2-tailed) .773 .908 .825 
N 47 36 36 
PAR10 Pearson Correlation -.181 .328 .204 
Sig. (2-tailed) .224 .051 .233 
N 47 36 36 
LEGBAS Pearson Correlation -.348* -.241 -.355* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .157 .034 
N 47 36 36 
EMPLBRD Pearson Correlation -.068 .353 .294 
Sig. (2-tailed) .727 .077 .137 
N 29 26 27 
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MEDIA Pearson Correlation -.161 .177 .096 
Sig. (2-tailed) .279 .303 .576 
N 47 36 36 
PARLCONF Pearson Correlation -.162 .381* .519** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .275 .022 .001 
N 47 36 36 
GOVCONF Pearson Correlation -.018 .395* .320 
Sig. (2-tailed) .902 .017 .057 
N 47 36 36 
CAT Pearson Correlation -.601** -.191 -.255 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .263 .134 
N 47 36 36 
OWNER Pearson Correlation -.470** -.225 -.241 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .186 .157 
N 47 36 36 
ESTABL Pearson Correlation .086 .161 .062 
Sig. (2-tailed) .574 .363 .728 
N 45 34 34 
PIH Pearson Correlation -.223 -.023 .163 
Sig. (2-tailed) .227 .908 .398 
N 31 27 29 
COMP Pearson Correlation 1 .268 .387* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .114 .020 
N 47 36 36 
MANYRS Pearson Correlation .268 1 .852** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .114  .000 
N 36 36 33 
COST08 Pearson Correlation .387* .852** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .000  
N 36 33 36 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Syntax only Conflict – Intensity: 
Political conflict and intensity of governance 
Observed variables 
COIBRD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA PARLCONF GOVCONF  
 
Correlation Matrix 
1   
.495 1   
-.417 -.644 1   
-.380 -.359 .671 1   
-.083 -.101 .302 -.243 1   
-.003 -.306 .427 .320 .083 1   
.065 -.225 .309 .065 .257 .472 1 
-.078 -.441 .516 .361 -.015 .656 .560 1 
 
Sample Size: 47 
Latent Variables: Conflict Intensit  
Paths 
Conflict -> MEDIA GOVCONF PARLCONF 
Intensit -> PARGLEN PAR10 COIBRD LEGBAS EMPLBRD 
Intensit = Conflict  
Print Residuals 
Path Diagram 
End of problem 
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Syntax Model 2 
Political conflict and intensity of governance 
Observed variables 
COIBRD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA PARLCONF GOVCONF CAT1 MINISTRY YEAR 
SUBSID COMP MANYRS COST08  
 
Correlation Matrix 
1   
.495 1   
-.417 -.644 1   
-.380 -.359 .671 1   
-.083 -.101 .302 -.243 1   
-.003 -.306 .427 .320 .083 1   
.065 -.225 .309 .065 .257 .472 1   
-.078 -.441 .516 .361 -.015 .656 .560 1   
-.263 -.382 .600 .720 -.110 .267 .140 .377 1   
-.261 -.348 .546 .541 .045 .151 -.049 .228 .711 1   
.089 .382 -.341 -.314 -.186 -.485 -.267 -.310 -.362 -.345 1   
.092 .032 -.055 .046 .170 -.016 .254 .094 .146 .181 -.392 1   
-.117 .043 -.181 -.348 -.068 -.161 -.162 -.025 -.601 -.470 .086 -.223 1  
.107 .020 .328 -.241 .353 .177 .381 .317 -.191 -.225 .161 -.023 .268 1  
-.020 .038 .204 -.355 .294 .096 .519 .230 -.255 -.241 .062 .163 .387 .852 1 
 
Sample Size: 47 
Latent Variables: Conflict Intensit Cat Owner Establ PIH Competit Size1 Size2  
 
Paths 
Conflict -> MEDIA GOVCONF PARLCONF 
Intensit -> PARGLEN PAR10 COIBRD LEGBAS EMPLBRD 
Cat -> CAT1 
Owner -> MINISTRY 
Establ -> YEAR 
PIH -> SUBSID 
Size1 -> MANYRS 
Size2 -> COST08 
Competit -> COMP 
 
Intensit = Conflict Cat Owner Establ PIH Competit Size1 Size2  
 
set error variance of YEAR = 0 
set error variance of OFFICE = 0 
set error variance of CAT1 = 0 
set error variance of MINISTRY = 0 
set error variance of SUBSID = 0 
set error variance of MANYRS = 0 
set error variance of COST08 = 0 
set error variance of COMP = 0 
 
Print Residuals 
 
Path Diagram 
End of problem 
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Syntax Model 3 (with 47 companies): 
Political conflict and intensity of governance 
Observed variables 
COIBRD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA PARLCONF GOVCONF CAT1 MINISTRY YEAR 
SUBSID COMP MANYRS COST08  
 
Correlation Matrix 
1   
.495 1   
-.417 -.644 1   
-.380 -.359 .671 1   
-.083 -.101 .302 -.243 1   
-.003 -.306 .427 .320 .083 1   
.065 -.225 .309 .065 .257 .472 1   
-.078 -.441 .516 .361 -.015 .656 .560 1   
-.263 -.382 .600 .720 -.110 .267 .140 .377 1   
-.261 -.348 .546 .541 .045 .151 -.049 .228 .711 1   
.089 .382 -.341 -.314 -.186 -.485 -.267 -.310 -.362 -.345 1   
.092 .032 -.055 .046 .170 -.016 .254 .094 .146 .181 -.392 1   
-.117 .043 -.181 -.348 -.068 -.161 -.162 -.025 -.601 -.470 .086 -.223 1  
.107 .020 .328 -.241 .353 .177 .381 .317 -.191 -.225 .161 -.023 .268 1  
-.020 .038 .204 -.355 .294 .096 .519 .230 -.255 -.241 .062 .163 .387 .852 1 
 
Sample Size: 47 
Latent Variables: Conflict Intensit Charact 
 
Paths 
Conflict -> MEDIA GOVCONF PARLCONF 
Intensit -> PARGLEN PAR10 COIBRD LEGBAS EMPLBRD SUBSID 
Charact -> MINISTRY YEAR SUBSID COMP MANYRS COST08 CAT1 
 
 
Intensit = Conflict Charact 
 
Let the errors of PAR10 and EMPLBRD covary 
Let the errors of LEGBAS and EMPLBRD covary 
Let the errors of MANYRS and COST08 covary 
Let the errors of COST08 and PARLCONF covary 
 
 
Print Residuals 
 
Path Diagram 
End of problem 
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Syntax model 3 (with 43 companies): 
Political conflict and intensity of governance 
Observed variables 
COIBRD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA PARLCONF GOVCONF CAT1 MINISTRY YEAR 
SUBSID COMP MANYRS COST08  
 
Correlation Matrix 
1        
.439     1                                                                                                                        
-.296    -.606   1                                                                                                                   
-.255    -.288   .621  1                                                                                                          
-.083    -.101   .302  -.243  1       
 -.020    -.329   .474  .355   .083    1     
-.004    -.262   .371  .097   .257    .483  1        
-.082    -.320   .508  .166   .197    .569  .639     1        
-.140    -.325   .552  .688   -.110   .291  .172     .251    1    
-.121    -.275   .478  .475   .045    .177  -.068    .037    .684  1                   
-.021    .348    -.292 -.265  -.186   -.508 -.310    -.160   -.324 -.297 1          
.092     .032    -.055 .046   .170    -.016 .254     .011    .146  .181  -.392  1       
-.099    .047    -.201 -.384  -.068   -.162 -.114    .018    -.647 -.493 .098   -
.223 1                                                       
.096     .008    .367  -.239  .353    .177  .392     .402    -.185 -.224 .157   -
.023 .264  1      
-.067    .009    .268  -.341  .294    .099  .547     .334    -.235 -.218 .049   
.163  .377  .853   1 
 
Sample Size: 43 
Latent Variables: Conflict Intensit Charact 
 
Paths 
Conflict -> MEDIA GOVCONF PARLCONF 
Intensit -> PARGLEN PAR10 COIBRD LEGBAS EMPLBRD  
Charact -> MINISTRY YEAR SUBSID COMP MANYRS COST08 CAT1 
 
 
Intensit = Conflict Charact 
 
Let the errors of PAR10 and EMPLBRD covary 
Let the errors of LEGBAS and EMPLBRD covary 
Let the errors of MANYRS and COST08 covary 
Let the errors of COST08 and PARLCONF covary 
 
 
Print Residuals 
 
Path Diagram 
End of problem 
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Questionnaire results: COI board averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPM # 15.1 15.4  16  19.1  19.2  19.3  19.4  19.5  21.1  21.2  21.3  21.4  21.5  21.6  21.7  21.8  
Entra Eiendom 4 1 2 1 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 4 5 3 5 1 
Entra Eiendom 5 3 4 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 3 3 
Entra Eiendom 2 2 2 5 2 2 5 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 
Entra Eiendom 4 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 
Entra Eiendom 2 3 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 
 
3,4 2 2,4 2,2 3 3,6 4,4 2,6 1,8 1,2 1,4 3,2 2,6 2 2,6 1,6 
Flytoget AS 5 1 2 2 2 4 5 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 
Flytoget AS 1 1 2 3 2 4 5 4 1 2 5 2 2 1 3 1 
Flytoget AS 2 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 
Flytoget AS 4 1 2 4 3 4 5 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 
Flytoget AS 3 1 1 2 2 2 6 5 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 2 
Flytoget AS 5 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 
 
3,3 1 1,8 2,8 2,5 3,5 4,8 4 1,5 1,8 2,5 2,3 2,2 1,5 2,5 1,2 
Mesta 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 6 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 
Mesta 4 1 2 4 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 
Mesta 4 6 4 3 4 4 5 5 2 2 3 4 4 2 5 2 
Mesta 4 2 1 2 2 3 5 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 4 2 
Mesta 1 1 2 5 2 2 2 5 1 #NULL! 1 2 1 2 5 1 
 
3 2,4 2,2 3,2 2,6 3,2 4,2 4,2 1,4 1,5 1,4 3 1,6 1,8 3,8 1,4 
NSB AS 5 2 2 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
NSB AS 2 4 2 4 2 2 5 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 
NSB AS 4 2 3 2 2 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 
NSB AS 5 2 3 2 3 4 5 4 2 1 2 4 2 2 4 2 
NSB AS 2 1 2 5 3 4 5 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 
NSB AS 2 2 2 #NULL! 2 5 5 6 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 3 
 
3,3 2,2 2,3 3,4 2,7 3,8 4,7 4,3 1,8 1,8 2 3 1,5 1,7 2,5 2,3 
Eksportfinans 2 6 2 2 1 4 5 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 
Eksportfinans 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 
Eksportfinans 4 1 #NULL! 1 2 4 6 5 2 3 2 4 3 1 1 #NULL! 
Eksportfinans 1 5 2 2 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Eksportfinans 1 2 2 4 2 4 5 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 
 
2 3 2 2 1,8 3,4 4,4 4,4 1,2 1,6 1,6 3 2 1,4 2,2 1,8 
Komm.banken 2 2 2 2 3 5 6 5 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 
                 Posten Norge 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 
Posten Norge 1 2 2 4 2 4 5 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 
Posten Norge 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 
Posten Norge 5 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 
Posten Norge 5 1 1 3 2 4 6 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 
Posten Norge 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Posten Norge 4 1 2 2 3 3 5 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 
 
3 1,4 2 2,6 2,4 3 4,6 3,9 2 1,7 1,9 3 2 1,6 2 1,7 
Statkraft 5 1 1 1 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 2 
Statkraft 2 2 4 2 2 2 5 5 1 1 2 4 1 3 4 2 
Statkraft 2 1 2 1 1 5 5 5 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 1 
Statkraft 4 2 2 1 2 4 5 5 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 
 
3,3 1,5 2,3 1,3 1,8 3,3 4,8 4,8 1,5 1,8 1,8 3,8 1,8 1,5 2,5 1,5 
ECC 2 2 2 5 2 3 5 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 
ECC 5 4 2 2 2 2 5 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 
ECC #NULL! 2 2 6 6 6 6 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
ECC 5 5 2 6 2 6 6 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 
 
4 3,3 2 4,8 3 4,3 5,5 3,8 1,8 1,5 1,5 2,8 2,3 1,5 1,8 1,8 
SN Spitsbergen  2 4 1 1 3 3 3 5 2 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 
SN Spitsbergen  2 1 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 
SN Spitsbergen  1 1 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 
SN Spitsbergen  4 4 2 2 3 5 5 3 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 
SN Spitsbergen  2 1 2 2 1 4 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 
SN Spitsbergen  2 1 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
 
2,2 2 1,8 2,2 2,3 3,8 4 3,7 1,7 2 2,3 2,2 2,7 1,5 1,3 1,3 
Vet.Med 4 1 2 2 3 5 5 2 3 1 1 5 2 1 5 1 
Vet.Med 2 1 1 4 1 1 5 5 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 1 
 
3 1 1,5 3 2 3 5 3,5 2,5 1,5 1,5 4,5 3 2,5 5 1 
Avinor AS 2 1 2 3 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 
Avinor AS 2 1 2 3 1 1 6 6 3 2 2 3 2 2 5 1 
Avinor AS 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 
Avinor AS 3 1 2 2 4 5 5 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Avinor AS 6 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 5 3 3 2 2 2 5 3 
Avinor AS 2 2 2 4 5 5 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 2 
Avinor AS 4 2 3 1 1 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 2 2 3 
Avinor AS 2 3 1 1 2 2 5 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 
Avinor AS 5 1 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 
Avinor AS 5 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 
Avinor AS 5 3 1 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 
Avinor AS 5 2 2 2 6 4 2 4 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 
Avinor AS 4 1 3 2 2 4 1 5 2 3 4 4 1 2 2 1 
Avinor AS 5 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Avinor AS 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 
 
3,8 1,7 2,1 2,5 3,1 3,5 3,9 4,3 2,1 1,6 2,1 2,7 1,5 1,5 2,2 1,4 
Enova SF 4 2 2 2 2 #NULL! 6 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 
Enova SF 4 5 3 2 2 4 5 5 2 1 2 4 1 1 3 2 
Enova SF 2 4 2 2 2 4 5 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 
Enova SF 5 2 2 4 1 2 5 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 
Enova SF 1 4 2 2 3 5 5 4 3 2 2 3 #NULL! 1 2 2 
Enova SF 5 5 2 2 2 4 5 4 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 #NULL! 
 
3,5 3,7 2,2 2,3 2 3,8 5,2 3,2 2,3 2 2,3 3,3 2,2 1,2 1,8 1,8 
                 Gassco AS 5 2 2 4 2 2 5 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2
Gassco AS 2 5 2 5 5 5 5 2 2 3 2 5 4 1 1 1 
Gassco AS 1 2 2 5 4 3 5 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 
Gassco AS 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 2 
Gassco AS 4 1 4 5 2 6 5 4 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 
 
3,5 2,7 2,3 4 3 3,8 4,7 2,8 2 1,5 1,8 3,7 2,3 1,7 1,8 2,2 
Gassnova 5 2 2 1 1 6 5 4 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Gassnova 5 6 2 1 2 3 5 3 3 2 3 5 2 3 3 5 
Gassnova 1 5 2 1 2 #NULL! 5 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Gassnova 4 1 1 5 2 4 5 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 
Gassnova 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 
 
3,6 3,2 2 1,8 2 4 4,6 2,8 2,6 1,6 2,2 3 1,8 2 2 2,4 
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Innovasjon Norge 5 5 2 2 5 4 5 4 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 
Innovasjon Norge 1 4 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Innovasjon Norge 5 2 2 1 1 1 5 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 1 
Innovasjon Norge 5 1 3 5 1 1 5 2 3 #NULL! 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Innovasjon Norge 1 5 2 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 
Innovasjon Norge 2 3 1 5 6 6 6 6 2 2 #NULL! 3 2 2 3 2 
Innovasjon Norge 5 5 3 1 2 5 5 5 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 
Innovasjon Norge 3 4 3 5 1 3 4 5 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 
 
3,4 3,6 2,4 2,8 2,4 3,4 4,5 3,9 2,3 2,1 2,3 2,8 1,9 1,5 2,1 1,8 
Kings Bay AS  4 3 2 2 2 3 5 5 2 2 3 4 1 2 2 2 
Kings Bay AS  5 2 2 1 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 1 
Kings Bay AS  2 2 2 1 1 2 4 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Kings Bay AS  2 5 2 2 3 3 6 6 3 2 2 4 2 1 1 2 
 
3,3 3 2 1,5 2 2,5 4,3 5,3 2,3 2 2,5 3,8 1,8 1,5 1,5 1,8 
NORFUND 4 4 2 2 4 4 5 4 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
NORFUND 5 1 2 4 2 2 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
NORFUND 5 2 3 1 1 1 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 1 
NORFUND 5 4 2 1 2 3 4 5 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 
 
4,8 2,8 2,3 2 2,3 2,5 4,5 3,8 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,8 2,3 2 2,3 1,8 
Norsk Eiendomsin 5 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Norsk Eiendomsin 3 2 1 4 2 3 5 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 5 2 
Norsk Eiendomsin 4 2 2 3 2 3 5 2 1 1 2 4 1 2 #NULL! 2 
Norsk Eiendomsin 3 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 
Norsk Eiendomsin 2 3 2 5 3 3 2 5 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Norsk Eiendomsin 2 1 1 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 2 1 
Norsk Eiendomsin 5 1 2 4 4 5 5 4 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 
 
3,4 1,7 1,7 3,7 3 3,9 4,3 3,3 1,7 1,9 1,9 2,6 2,1 1,3 2,3 1,6 
NRK 4 5 2 2 2 4 5 5 2 3 2 4 3 2 3 1 
NRK 2 6 2 2 2 6 6 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 #NULL! 2 
NRK 2 #NULL! 3 1 2 4 5 5 2 3 3 #NULL! 4 3 3 3 
NRK 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 
NRK 5 1 2 2 2 4 5 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
NRK 2 2 2 1 2 3 6 5 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
 
2,8 3 2,2 1,5 2 4 5 4,3 2 2,7 2,3 2,6 3,2 2,2 2,2 2 
NSD 2 5 2 2 2 6 6 5 3 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 
NSD 2 2 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 2 
NSD 5 5 3 6 3 5 6 4 2 2 5 5 5 2 2 5 
NSD 2 4 1 2 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
2,8 4 2,3 3 2,5 4,8 5,3 3,5 2,5 2,3 3,3 4 3,5 2,3 2,3 3 
Norsk Tipping AS 5 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Norsk Tipping AS 4 #NULL! 2 4 4 5 5 5 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 
Norsk Tipping AS 5 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 2 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 
Norsk Tipping AS 5 1 2 1 2 3 5 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Norsk Tipping AS 2 2 1 1 3 2 3 5 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 2 
 
4,2 1,5 1,8 2 2,8 3,4 4,6 4,6 1,8 1,5 2,3 3 2,3 1 1,5 1,8 
Petoro AS 4 1 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Petoro AS 2 4 2 5 2 2 5 2 1 3 5 3 2 2 5 2 
Petoro AS 4 4 2 1 1 1 4 3 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 
Petoro AS 5 1 2 5 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 3 1 
Petoro AS 5 1 3 2 5 5 4 4 1 2 2 3 3 1 5 2 
 
4 2,2 2,4 3 2,8 3,2 4,4 2,6 2,2 2,6 2,6 3,2 2,4 1,8 3,6 2 
Simula 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 6 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Simula 3 3 2 3 1 3 5 5 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
Simula 2 1 2 6 2 6 5 4 2 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 
Simula 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 
Simula 4 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 
 
2,4 2 2 3 1,8 3,8 5 4,4 2 1,6 1,2 3,4 1,8 1,2 1,4 1,6 
SIVA SF 5 2 2 2 2 4 5 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
SIVA SF 5 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
SIVA SF 5 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 
 
5 1,7 2 2 2 2,7 4,7 4,7 2 1,7 2,3 3 2 2 1,7 1,7 
Statnett SF 4 4 2 2 2 2 5 4 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Statnett SF 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 
Statnett SF 5 2 2 2 3 2 4 5 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 
Statnett SF 3 3 2 3 2 4 5 5 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 
Statnett SF 2 5 2 1 2 6 5 5 1 1 3 4 3 1 1 1 
Statnett SF 2 1 2 1 3 3 5 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 2 2 
Statnett SF 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 
Statnett SF 2 2 4 5 4 5 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
 
3,3 3 2,3 2,4 2,8 3,4 4,4 3,9 1,9 1,5 2,1 3,1 2,3 1,6 1,8 1,6 
Statskog SF 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 3 2 1 5 5 5 5 1 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 
Statskog SF 2 1 2 2 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 6 6 2 2 5 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 1 1 2 4 3 6 6 6 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Statskog SF 1 5 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Statskog SF 4 1 2 2 2 3 2 5 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 1 2 3 4 2 3 5 6 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 2 3 3 6 2 4 6 2 2 1 4 3 1 3 1 2 
Statskog SF 4 4 2 1 2 2 5 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 
Statskog SF 1 1 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 
 
2,5 2,5 2,1 3 2,9 3,6 4,7 3,8 2 1,6 2,2 2,7 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,7 
Uninett AS 5 4 2 5 3 4 5 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 
Uninett AS 2 4 2 1 2 4 4 5 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 
Uninett AS 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 
Uninett AS 2 2 2 6 3 4 5 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Uninett AS 4 1 2 5 4 6 6 4 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 
 
3,2 2,6 2 3,8 2,8 4,4 4,8 3,4 2,4 2 1,8 3 2 1,4 1,6 1,6 
Univ. Svalbard  4 1 1 2 4 5 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 3 
Univ. Svalbard  3 4 2 4 3 4 5 1 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 
Univ. Svalbard  4 2 1 2 2 4 5 4 2 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 
Univ. Svalbard  1 6 2 6 1 2 5 1 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 3 
 
3 3,3 1,5 3,5 2,5 3,8 4,8 2 2,3 2 2,8 3,8 2,3 1,5 2 2,8 
 
GRA 1900 – Master Thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AS Vinmonopolet 2 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 
AS Vinmonopolet 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 
AS Vinmonopolet 2 2 2 1 2 5 5 3 1 1 2 4 2 1 3 2 
AS Vinmonopolet 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
AS Vinmonopolet 4 2 2 4 4 5 6 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 2 
 
3 1,6 2 2,4 2,4 4 4,2 3 2,2 1,8 2,4 2,6 2 1,4 1,8 1,4 
Norsk Helsenett 4 3 2 2 2 3 6 6 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Norsk Helsenett 5 1 1 2 2 3 6 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 
Norsk Helsenett 4 2 1 3 2 4 5 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 
Norsk Helsenett 5 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Norsk Helsenett 5 1 2 5 4 5 5 2 2 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 
Norsk Helsenett 5 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 2 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 
 
4,7 1,7 1,5 2,7 2,3 3,3 5 3,8 2,2 2 2,5 3 2,5 1,5 1,8 1,8 
HiBOdø 5 4 1 3 5 5 5 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 
HiBOdø 5 3 2 4 #NULL! 5 5 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 
HiBOdø #NULL! #NULL! 2 3 2 5 #NULL! 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 
HiBOdø 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 1 2 2 
HiBOdø 3 3 2 1 2 5 5 5 3 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 
HiBOdø 3 2 2 2 4 5 5 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
 
4 3,2 2 2,7 3 4,5 4,6 3 2,8 2,2 1,8 3,2 2,3 1,3 2 2 
HIL 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 4 2 2 1 4 1 1 2 2 
HIL 5 5 1 2 #NULL! 5 5 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
HIL #NULL! 2 2 3 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 4 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 
HIL #NULL! 5 1 1 3 4 5 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 
HIL #NULL! 3 1 2 #NULL! 4 5 5 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
 
3,5 3,4 1,4 2 2,5 4 5 3,8 2 2 1,8 3,4 2,2 1,6 2,4 2,4 
HIBergen 4 4 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 
HIBergen 4 2 2 1 1 2 4 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 
HIBergen 5 1 2 2 2 3 2 5 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 
HIBergen #NULL! 3 2 4 3 4 5 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
HIBergen 5 2 3 2 3 4 5 2 3 2 2 4 3 1 3 3 
 
4,5 2,4 2,2 2,2 2,2 3 4,2 3,8 2,6 2,2 2,4 3,2 2,2 1,6 1,8 2 
NTNU #NULL! 4 2 2 4 5 #NULL! 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 
 NTNU 5 2 2 2 3 5 5 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 
 NTNU 1 2 1 3 2 3 5 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 3 3 
 NTNU #NULL! 2 3 2 2 2 5 5 4 2 4 3 4 1 3 2 
 NTNU 2 2 2 3 1 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 
 NTNU #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 2 #NULL! #NULL! 5 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 
 NTNU #NULL! 5 2 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 
 NTNU 5 1 #NULL! 1 2 3 #NULL! 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 
 NTNU 5 2 2 3 4 5 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
3,6 2,3 2 2,5 2,5 3,4 4,8 3,9 3,3 2,8 2,8 3,4 2,5 2,3 2,6 2,4 
UIB #NULL! 1 2 1 4 4 #NULL! 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
UIB #NULL! 1 3 1 2 #NULL! #NULL! 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 4 
UIB 5 3 3 1 6 5 5 4 3 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 
UIB 5 2 3 3 4 5 5 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 
UIB 5 4 2 4 3 5 5 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 
UIB 4 2 1 1 5 1 3 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 
UIB #NULL! 1 2 1 2 3 #NULL! 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 
 
4,8 2,4 2,2 2 4 3,8 4,5 2,4 2,6 2,6 2 3 2,6 1,8 2 1,8 
Lånekassen 5 1 2 5 2 3 5 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Lånekassen 5 1 3 4 1 3 5 2 1 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 
Lånekassen 5 1 2 2 3 3 5 5 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 
Lånekassen 5 1 3 2 4 5 5 #NULL! 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 
Lånekassen #NULL! 2 2 5 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
Lånekassen 4 1 #NULL! 2 5 5 5 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 #NULL! 
 
4,8 1,2 2,4 3,3 3,3 4 5 2,8 2,7 2,3 2,8 3 2 1,8 2,2 2,2 
SSB 5 3 2 3 2 2 5 4 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
SSB #NULL! 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
SSB 5 5 2 4 2 2 5 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 #NULL! 
SSB #NULL! 1 3 4 3 #NULL! #NULL! 2 3 3 3 3 #NULL! 3 3 3 
 
5 2,8 2,3 3,5 2,5 2,3 4,3 3,3 3,3 2,8 2,8 3,3 3 2,5 2,5 2,7 
Finanstilsynet #NULL! 1 2 3 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 2 #NULL! 1 1 3 1 
Finanstilsynet 5 5 2 2 5 5 #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Finanstilsynet #NULL! 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 4 
Finanstilsynet 4 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Finanstilsynet #NULL! 3 2 4 4 #NULL! 5 4 3 2 4 5 4 3 3 #NULL! 
Finanstilsynet 5 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
 
4,7 2,6 2 2,2 2,8 2,8 4,3 4,3 2,2 2 2,4 2,8 2,6 2 2,2 2,5 
FFI 5 2 2 5 2 3 5 5 2 1 2 4 2 2 1 2 
FFI 5 2 2 4 #NULL! 4 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
FFI #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 
FFI 5 4 2 4 1 2 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
FFI 2 5 2 5 4 5 #NULL! #NULL! 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 
 
4,3 3,3 2 4 2,5 3,4 4,8 4,5 2,8 1,8 2,4 2,8 2,4 2 1,8 2,2 
Met.inst #NULL! 5 2 3 2 3 #NULL! 3 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 2 
Met.inst #NULL! 4 2 #NULL! #NULL! 5 5 #NULL! 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 
Met.inst 5 2 2 1 3 3 5 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 
Met.inst #NULL! 1 2 1 1 1 3 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 4 
 
5 1,5 2 1 2 2 4 3,5 2,5 2 1,5 3 2,5 1 2 3 
Havforsk 5 2 3 4 1 2 5 2 2 2 4 #NULL! 1 1 2 1 
Havforsk 5 5 2 4 3 5 6 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 
Havforsk #NULL! 2 1 3 4 3 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Havforsk #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 
Havforsk #NULL! 4 2 5 5 5 5 1 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 3 
Havforsk 5 2 3 2 2 5 5 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Havforsk 5 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 
Havforsk 5 3 3 5 1 #NULL! 5 5 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 
 
5 2,7 2,3 3,3 2,6 3,8 4,9 2,6 2,1 2,5 2,4 2,7 1,9 1,9 2,5 2 
Husbanken 5 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 3 1 3 3 2 1 1 3 
Husbanken 2 2 2 5 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
 
3,5 1,5 2 3,5 2 2 3,5 4,5 3 1,5 2,5 2,5 2 1 1,5 2,5 
Pensjonskasse 4 2 #NULL! 3 2 #NULL! #NULL! 2 5 #NULL! 4 4 #NULL! 3 3 #NULL! 
 
4 2 #NULL! 3 2 #NULL! #NULL! 2 5 #NULL! 4 4 #NULL! 3 3 #NULL! 
Forsvarsbygg 5 2 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 3 3 
 
5 2 3 4 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 3 3 
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Questionnaires: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Riksteateret 5 2 2 2 2 2 #NULL! 5 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 1 
Riksteateret #NULL! 5 2 4 1 4 5 4 2 2 4 4 2 1 2 2 
Riksteateret 3 1 3 1 1 3 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Riksteateret #NULL! 5 2 1 1 2 5 5 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 
Riksteateret 5 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 
 
4,3 3 2,2 2 1,4 2,6 5 4,4 1,6 2 1,6 2,4 2 1,2 1,6 1,4 
Rikskonsertene #NULL! 3 2 1 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 
 
#NULL! 3 2 1 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 
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Additional Data-Description 
Six main sources of data have been used, which are not cited in the bibliography 
due to their character: 
• Questionnaires sent to board of directors and CEO’s of 
companies/agencies (2010) 
o Unlike the other static data, this input allows for a qualitative 
interpretation of what is actually the ‘state of things’ in the 
relationship between ministries and companies \ administrative 
bodies.  
o This questionnaire contains questions which yield responses 
concerning the stability of tasks, competition environment and 
‘intensity’ of governance from the ministry. Potentially it can thus 
be used both to measure the independent and the dependent 
variable(s). 
o Though more subjective and less reliable, these data are seen as a 
good indicator, especially since they are collected recently. 
 
• Key figures from Annual reports of companies (2006, 2008) 
o The annual reports of the companies in question present many 
interesting data, such as turnover, leadership bonuses, FTE’s, 
goals, general budget, cost structure and results. 
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o These data are seen as highly reliable, but might have some error 
margin when compared across companies – as different methods of 
calculation are used. However, all firms are regulated by private 
audit law, and thus the figures should represent more or less the 
same thing. 
 
• Archives of the Norwegian Parliaments (1998 – 2010) 
o The Norwegian parliament offers open entrance into all passed 
cases. These documents will be skimmed for company names. The 
threat to these data’s reliability is the fact that electronical 
skimming might end up finding cases which are not really about 
the specific company – but rather just mentioning it. However, this 
is not seen as particularly grave, as ‘all PR are good PR’, and thus 
still represents the general ‘swift’ around a company/agency. 
o The reports from the Storting are available from the sessions in 
1998 to 2010. The reports from hearings (spørretimene) in the 
Storting are available from the 1993–1994 sessions until today. 
 
• Data from Norwegian media-analyst ‘Retriever’ 
o Retriever is a media-surveillance and analyst company, which 
provides services to private and public customers. Through their 
database, I will collect all (written) national media cases relating to 
the search string; “company name* AND (parliament 
representative* OR "representative in parliament" OR "deputy 
representative in parliament" OR ”minister*” OR ”secretary of 
state”)). The search will include all publications between 1990-
1045 
o The problem with these data is that they also capture all cases 
where the publicity is not necessarily negative –thus not 
encapsulating and isolating ‘conflict’. If there is time, this data 
should therefore be manually skimmed – to ensure its quality. 
 
• Data from the Norwegian Business Register (Brønnøysundregisteret) 
o The register provides information on basic characteristics of the 
companies, such as location of headquarters, date of establishment 
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etc. This source should be fully reliable. 
 
• Data from the Norwegian Governments “State Ownership Report” 
2006, 2008 
o Each year, the Norwegian government publishes a report which 
states the goals and results of their companies. Besides 
categorizing the companies into four types of more or less profit 
maximizing and/or sector political tools of government, this report 
also presents key figures from the companies conducted business. 
The report is related to the data published in the companies annual 
reports – but also provides the ministries subjective views. 
 
‘Conflict’ Indicators: MEDIA, GOVCONF, PARLCONF 
  
STORTINGET 
   
REGJERINGEN 
  
 
Medieoppslag Saker (referat) Instillinger Skr.spørsmål Proposisjoner NOU Meldinger    TOT 
 
        
 Entra Eiendom AS  12 36 53 4 93 49 5 17 71 
Flytoget AS  53 69 59 36 164 44 4 31 79 
Mesta Konsern AS  19 0 3 1 4 4 3 1 8 
           
 NSB AS  391 195 129 124 448 425 102 187 714 
Eksportfinans ASA 12 73 68 21 162 78 6 30 114 
Kommunalbanken AS 5 99 125 3 227 88 15 38 141 
Posten Norge AS  258 95 227 52 374 262 7 24 293 
Statkraft AS 40 69 134 18 221 90 26 38 154 
Electronic Chart Centre AS 4 50 49 15 114 159 78 84 321 
Store Norske Spitsbergen AS 4 45 84 6 135 82 20 41 143 
Vetrinærmedisinsk Oppdrags. 0 9 26 1 36 25 1 13 39 
           
 Avinor AS  44 119 102 113 334 310 41 196 547 
Bjørnøen AS  3 9 18 0 27 15 8 24 47 
Enova SF  11 18 45 24 87 47 9 15 71 
Gassco AS  7 39 33 37 109 43 5 23 71 
Gassnova SF  7 11 11 4 26 17 1 7 25 
Innovasjon Norge  490 136 149 101 386 122 20 66 208 
Itas amb AS  0 0 2 0 2 7 0 4 11 
Kings Bay AS  30 43 78 0 121 50 14 22 86 
KITH 1 21 30 5 56 54 12 18 84 
Norfund  55 56 63 12 131 47 3 26 76 
Norsk Eiendomsinformasjon AS  0 37 81 4 122 47 13 18 78 
Norsk Rikskringkasting AS  14 47 74 12 133 68 22 35 125 
NSD AS 3 12 33 4 49 71 38 48 157 
Norsk Tipping AS  73 158 99 40 297 86 27 42 155 
Petoro AS  29 49 67 7 123 47 5 22 74 
Simula Research Laboratory AS  1 7 9 2 18 94 63 65 222 
SIVA SF  9 58 87 3 148 64 9 27 100 
Statnett SF  22 71 119 17 207 82 22 39 143 
Statskog SF  11 80 118 20 218 96 19 24 139 
UNINETT AS  1 18 29 3 50 35 11 20 66 
Universitetssenteret på Svalbard AS  3 8 16 1 25 19 5 12 36 
AS Vinmonopolet  48 167 134 25 326 92 33 34 159 
Norsk Helsenett SF 4 3 6 1 10 11 3 4 18 
           
 1. Helse Sør-Øst 146        
 2. Helse Vest  744        
 3. Helse Midt-Norge 79        
 4. Helse Nord  1564        
            
 Nationaltheatret  529 26 28 4 58 33 10 17 60 
Den Norske Opera og Ballett. 89 166 167 104 437 109 36 69 214 
           
 Jernbaneverket 440 182 156 139 477 86 11 25 122 
Høgskolen i Bodø 68 26 36 14 76 120 33 53 206 
Høgskolen i Lillehammer 74 19 14 5 38 67 24 36 127 
Høgskolen i Bergen 166 66 99 25 190 223 70 86 379 
NTNU 93 87 130 23 240 251 98 109 458 
Universitet i Bergen  1073 99 110 41 250 389 88 73 550 
Statens Lånekasse for Utdanning 113 138 164 66 368 142 39 54 235 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1195 105 127 52 284 169 118 97 384 
Finanstilsynet 12 13 15 7 35 31 26 8 65 
Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt 115 60 113 21 194 134 29 63 226 
Meteorologisk Institutt 91 56 71 11 138 124 22 61 207 
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Havforskningsinstituttet 104 125 106 65 296 153 17 56 226 
Sent.for ABM-utvikling 23 55 76 14 145 73 12 47 132 
Husbanken 406 170 169 44 383 111 22 39 172 
Statens Pensjonskasse  283 99 188 29 316 206 41 36 283 
Forsvarsbygg  51 94 93 52 239 103 9 33 145 
Statsbygg  663 127 165 72 364 157 9 39 205 
GIEK 45 73 106 19 198 101 8 32 141 
Norsk Romsenter 31 43 75 3 121 81 3 28 112 
Riksteateret 30 6 17 5 28 3 2 10 15 
Rikskonsertene 129 21 41 9 71 57 8 38 103 
 
List of Subsidiaries: 
Datterselskaper: (Medregner også ”tilknyttede selskaper”, der eierandelen er relevant >20%) 
Entra Eiendom AS  
Brattørkaia AS (52%) 
Papirbredden Eiendom AS (60%) 
Kristiansand Kunnskapspark Eiendom AS (51%) 
Oslo S Utvikling AS (33,33 %) 
UP Entra AS (50 %) 
Ullandhaug Energi AS (44 %) 
Kunnskapsbyen Eiendom AS (33,75 %) 
Youngstorget Parkeringshus AS (21,26 %) 
Tverrforbindelsen AS (16,67 %) 
 
Flytoget AS  
0 
 
Mesta Konsern AS  
Mesta Drift as 
Mesta Entreprenør as 
Mesta Industri as 
Mesta Elektro as 
Mesta Eiendom as 
Mesta Verksted as 
 
NSB AS 
Mantena AS 
ROM Eiendom AS 
Arrive AS 
Svenska Tågkompaniet AB 
NSB Gjøvikbanen 
NSB Trafikkservice AS 
Nettbuss AS 
Cargonet AS 
Finse Forsikring AS 
 
Eksportfinans ASA 
0 
 
Kommunalbanken AS 
0 
 
Posten Norge AS  
Bring Express  
ErgoGroup AS 
Bring Frigo  
Bring Mail  
Bring Citymail Sweden  
Bring Dialog   
Bring Parcels  
Bring Cargo  
Bring Warehousing  
Bring Supply Services  
(which was formerly Nor-Cargo, Frigoscandia, Box Solutions, Box- Group/-Delivery, Pan Nordic 
Logistics (PNL), Scanex B.V., Nettlast Hadeland) 
 
Statkraft SF  Statkraft AS 
Trondheim Energi (100%) 
Skagerak Energi (66,62%),  
Naturkraft (50%),  
SN Power (50%), (statkraft norfund power invest) 
Bergenshalvøens Kommunale Kraftselskap (49,9%), Agder Energi (45,5%),  
E.ON Sverige (44,6%) 
Småkraft. 
 
Electronic Chart Centre AS 
0 
 
Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani AS 
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Store Norske Spitsbergen Grubekompani AS,  
Store Norske Gull AS 
Store Norske Boliger AS  
 
og har også eierandel i noen andre virksomheter på Svalbard. lompensenteret (50%) Materiallageret (50%) 
 
Vetrinærmedisinsk Oppdragssenter AS 
0 
 
Avinor AS  
Oslo Lufthavn AS (OSL) 
Avinors Parkeringsanlegg AS 
Flesland Eiendom AS 
Værnes Eiendom AS 
Sola Hotel Eiendom AS (SEAS) 
 
 
 
Bjørnøen AS  
Er selv underlagt Kings-Bay 
 
Enova SF  
0 
 
Gassco AS  
Gassco AS Avd Kårstø prosessanlegg  
Gassco AS Avd Kollsnes Prosessanlegg  
Gassco AS Avd Draupner 
 
Gassnova SF  
0 
 
Innovasjon Norge  
Investinor 
Nortra AS (100%)   VisitNorway AS (100%). 
 Kings Bay AS  
0 
(bjørnøen) 
 
Kompetansesenter for IT i Helse- og sosialsektoren AS  
0 
 
Norfund  
SN power (statkraft norfund power invest) 
 
Norsk Eiendomsinformasjon AS  
0 
 
Norsk Rikskringkasting AS  
NRK Aktivum (skiller komersielle tjenester fra det lisensfinansierte morselskapet (ESA lovgivn.) 
 
Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS  
0 
 
Norsk Tipping AS  
Fabelaktiv 
Buypass AS 
 
Petoro AS  
0 
 
Simula Research Laboratory AS  
Simula Innovation AS 
Simula school of  Research and innovation AS 
 
 
SIVA SF  
Eierkapital I 145 selskaper!17
+SIVA International Management AS 
SIVA Eiendom Holding AS 
 
 
 
Statnett SF  
Statnett Transport AS  
Statnett Forsikring AS  
Nord.Link AS  
Noreveien 26 AS  
NorGer AS  
NorGer KS 
Nord Pool Spot AS (30 %) 
 
 
Statskog SF  
Borregaard Skogsdrift AS 
Terra Eiendomsutvikling AS 
Prevista AS 
BioVarme AS 
 
UNINETT AS  
UNINETT FAS 
UNINETT Norid 
UNINETT Sigma 
 
Universitetssenteret på Svalbard AS  
0 
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AS Vinmonopolet  
AS Nordpolet 
+over 260 butikker som er individuelle AS 
 
Norsk Helsenett SF  
0 
 
All variables_sorted: 
 
COMPANY COIBOARD PARGLEN PAR10 LEGBAS EMPLBRD MEDIA PARLCONF GOVCONF CAT OWNER ESTABL PIH COMP MANYRS COST08 
Entra Ei 8 54 0 1 28 12 93 71 1 1 2000 0 1,5 158,5 455657000 
Flytoget 9,5 20 0 1 37 53 164 79 1 1 1992 0 1 283 520397000 
Mesta Ko 8,9 60 0 1 30 19 4 8 1 1 2008 6 1,5 2610 6147400000 
NSB AS   9,6 36 1 1 30 391 448 714 3 2 2002 9 0,5 9007 10224000000 
Eksportf 9,7 65 0 2 12 12 162 114 3 1 1962 0 2,25 106 11187285000 
Kommunal 1 28 0 1 12 5 227 141 3 3 1999 0 1,5 41,9 8472608000 
Posten N 11,29 55 1 1 40 258 374 293 3 2 2002 10 1,5 25851 28302000000 
Statkraf 13,17 83 0 1 22 40 221 154 3 1 2004 7 1 2633 7229000000 
Electron 8,25 36 0 1 0 4 114 321 3 1 1999 0 1,5 9999 17111492 
Store No 8,33 38 0 2 37 4 135 143 3 1 1916 3 1,875 55 183068000 
Vetrinær 10 41 0 2 20 0 36 39 3 4 1991 0 1,5 9999 9999 
Avinor A 10,73 77 0 1 40 44 334 547 4 2 2002 5 0,563 2992 6016200000 
Enova SF 9,03 13 0 4 17 11 87 71 4 5 2001 0 0 9999 58000000 
Gassco A 6,93 34 0 1 37 7 109 71 4 5 2001 3 0 311 9999 
Gassnova 10,62 88 0 4 16 7 26 25 4 5 2007 0 0 24 37000000 
Innovasj 10,48 28 0 3 18 490 386 208 4 1 2004 3 0 700 987000000 
Kings Ba 14,58 52 0 1 9999 30 121 86 4 1 1916 0 0,063 
 
47000000 
Norfund  20 82 0 3 0 55 131 76 4 6 1997 1 0,375 36,9 49000000 
Norsk Ei 6,66 32 0 1 25 0 122 78 4 7 1987 0 0 68 208000000 
Norsk Ri 14,62 18 1 1 33 14 133 125 4 9 1996 1 0,5 3442 4444000000 
Norsk sa 12,42 25 0 1 29 3 49 157 4 8 2003 0 0,563 65 39000000 
Norsk Ti 11,3 58 0 1 29 73 297 155 4 9 1947 2 0 349 7721000000 
Petoro A 12,85 23 0 1 29 29 123 74 4 5 2001 0 0 58 196000000 
Simula R 8,3 41 0 2 29 1 18 222 4 8 2002 2 1,5 43,5 99000000 
SIVA SF  15 115 0 4 9999 9 148 100 4 1 1992 147 0 32 231000000 
Statnett 9,75 65 0 4 33 22 207 143 4 5 1991 7 0 673 3062000000 
Statskog 7,75 90 0 4 29 11 218 139 4 4 1993 4 0,563 157 208000000 
UNINETT  7,25 61 0 1 17 1 50 66 4 8 1993 3 0 53 227000000 
Universi 9,75 89 0 1 22 3 25 36 4 8 2002 0 0 109 88000000 
AS Vinmo 9,45 30 0 1 33 48 326 159 4 10 1922 263 0 1215 10198000000 
Norsk He 12,4 203 0 4 25 4 10 18 4 10 2009 0 0 66 141377381 
Høgsk Bo 2,7 0 1 5 9999 68 76 206 5 8 1977 9999 0,375 9999 9999 
Høgsk Li 2 0 1 5 9999 74 38 127 5 8 1970 9999 0,375 9999 9999 
Høgsk Be 6,9 0 1 5 9999 166 190 379 5 8 1994 9999 0,375 9999 9999 
Norges T 8,05 0 1 5 9999 93 240 458 5 8 1996 9999 0,375 9999 9999 
Universi 6,25 0 1 5 9999 1073 250 550 5 8 1946 9999 0,375 9999 9999 
Statens  6,6 0 1 5 9999 113 368 235 5 8 1971 9999 0 320 9999 
Statisti 11,25 0 1 5 9999 1195 284 384 5 11 1876 9999 0,125 759 672276000 
Finansti 6,52 0 1 5 9999 12 35 65 5 11 1986 9999 0 206,3 23620000 
Forsvare 2,05 0 1 5 9999 115 194 226 5 12 1946 9999 0,125 665 660009000 
Meteorol 10,5 0 1 5 9999 91 138 207 5 8 1970 9999 0 422 411021000 
Havforsk 5,36 0 1 5 9999 104 296 226 5 13 9999 9999 0 652 817887000 
Husbanke 5 0 1 5 9999 406 383 172 5 3 1946 9999 0 340 9999 
Statens  14 0 1 5 9999 283 316 283 5 14 1917 9999 0,375 342 334490000 
Forsvars 1 0 1 5 9999 51 239 145 5 12 9999 9999 0,375 1279 3590964000 
Riksteat 1,93 0 1 5 9999 30 28 15 5 9 1949 9999 1 9999 9999 
Rikskons -3 0 1 5 9999 129 71 103 5 9 1967 9999 1 9999 9999 
